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PREFACE 
or the past five decades, the European integration process has been a 
driving force for trade, innovation and growth, delivering tangible 
benefits to all Europeans. New challenges lie ahead, and fresh goals 
have to be set if the EU wants to maintain its competitiveness in a 
globalised world. Specifically, if the EU aims to become the world’s most 
competitive economy, it needs to have the most effective legislative 
process, powered by efficient and accountable institutions and a world-
class public administration. EU member states must also do their part, as 
better regulation is a shared responsibility. This means above all ‘thinking 
European first’ to achieve commonly agreed goals rather than looking 
primarily at national interests. The benefits of this approach are clearly 
visible in the Internal Market, which is the most evident win-win situation 
Europe faces today. The completion of the Single Market and the full 
realisation of the free movement of goods, services, people and capital 
enshrined in the EC Treaty will ultimately result in enhanced competition, 
increased consumer choice, better business and job opportunities and a 
stronger Europe. There is no better way of restoring confidence in the EU 
than by producing, implementing and communicating better EU legislation 
to the benefit of all European citizens and companies.  
This report is the product of a joint project initiated by the Centre for 
European Policy Studies (CEPS) and the Confederation of Swedish 
Enterprise, the major business organisation in Sweden. Three expert groups 
of international academics, policy-makers, business representatives and 
other stakeholders have joined forces to analyse the issues facing the EU 
and to put forward some suggestions for reform in the short and medium 
term. At the end of this report, we also provide more forward-looking 
ideas, resulting from discussions between CEPS and the Confederation of 
Swedish Enterprise, on how to fully achieve the Internal Market and 
eliminate harmful barriers to cross-border trade in the European Union. 
These ideas are offered as a contribution from the research and business 
worlds for a better functioning Union in the 21st century. 
 
 
Staffan Jerneck 
Director & Director of Corporate Relations, CEPS 
F  
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POLICY-MAKING IN THE EU 
ACHIEVEMENTS, CHALLENGES AND 
PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Overview – Shaping the ‘post-Lisbon European Union’ 
Since its foundation, the European Union has always been a very 
controversial project, with Euro-sceptics and Euro-enthusiasts often 
animatedly challenging each other’s views. This never-ending debate is 
now reaching new peaks, after the Irish referendum that rejected the Treaty 
of Lisbon, and in the wake of one of the worst financial crises ever faced by 
the Old Continent. The ‘cost of non-Europe’ – an expression coined as long 
ago as the Cecchini report in 1988 – is still a major issue in the debate on the 
future of the EU, especially since the GNP increment (up to 6.5%) predicted 
by the Cecchini report was not confirmed by subsequent research. 
Likewise, the European Commission’s publication on the ‘economic cost of 
non-Lisbon’ linked macroeconomic benefits to the achievement of very 
ambitious objectives, which as of today have only partly been met. 
Recently, the Dutch Bureau of Economic Analysis estimated that the 
completion of the Internal Market for goods and services can add up to 
10% to the EU GDP in the long run. This shows that the potential for 
further integration is enormous, and still waits to be fully unlocked.  
The EU integration process has undoubtedly been a driving force for 
the welfare of European citizens in the past two decades; however, EU 
decision-making has often been criticised as slow, complex and producing 
too many ‘lowest common denominator’ solutions. On the other hand, 
citizens continue to feel distant from the EU’s political processes, and this 
undermines the legitimacy of many decisions. This lack of ownership in the 
Union was most recently underlined again by the Irish no-vote to the 
Lisbon Treaty, but is also reflected in the low turnouts for European 
Parliament elections which have been decreasing constantly since the first 
direct elections in 1979, and are likely to follow the same trend in 2009. POLICY-MAKING IN THE EU | iii 
If the EU wants to become the 
world's most competitive 
economy, it needs to have the 
world’s most effective 
legislative process. 
The coming months are a “one-
time opportunity” to unleash 
the potential of the Union 
through a more efficient, 
democratic, transparent and 
inclusive European decision-
making process. 
How can Europe emerge from 
this  impasse?  T o  b e  s u r e ,  i f  t h e  E U  
wants to become the world’s most 
competitive economy, it needs to have 
the world’s most effective legislative 
process, powered by efficient and 
accountable institutions. At the same time, member states must understand 
that better regulation is a shared responsibility, and that they should ‘think 
European first’, before looking at their national interest. After all, a 
complete and well-functioning Internal Market is the most evident ‘win-
win’ situation Europe faces today, as it carries the promise of enhanced 
competition and consumer choice, more business and job opportunities, 
and a stronger Europe in a globalised context. And there is no better way of 
restoring confidence in the EU project than producing, implementing and 
communicating better EU legislation to the benefit of all Europeans.  
Against this background, the coming months will coincide with a 
‘Camelot moment’ for the Union. Major initiatives of the last decade such 
as the Lisbon strategy and the i2010 
strategy will come to an end. At the 
same time, the first round of 
administrative burdens reduction will 
be completed, and the first results of 
the Single Market Review will be 
available. All this places a heavy 
responsibility on the next EU 
Presidencies, but also a ‘one-time opportunity’ to unleash the potential of 
the Union through a more efficient, democratic, transparent and inclusive 
European decision-making process. 
This report provides recommendations on how to improve the 
policy-making process in the ‘post-Lisbon’ European Union. The 
suggestions contained in the next section follow from the proceedings of 
three expert groups that discussed three sets of complementary issues: the 
future of EU decision-making (Pillar I), better regulation (Pillar II) and 
implementation and subsidiarity (Pillar III). For each expert group, we 
invited senior officials from all EU institutions, academics, practitioners, 
politicians and various other stakeholders. What emerged from the 
meetings, with remarkable consistency across the different expert groups, 
is a new vision of the functioning and role of the EU in steering European 
citizens and businesses towards enhanced competitiveness and prosperity 
in the years to come. iv | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
•  More efficient EU institutions. The internal decision-making process 
can be streamlined in all EU institutions. This implies, i.a. a more 
efficient use of resources throughout the policy cycle, more 
coordination between internal structures (e.g. Commission 
Directorates General (DGs), Parliamentary Committees and Council 
formations), a more effective role of consultative bodies and a better 
allocation of roles and competences between the institutions.  
•  More accountable EU institutions. Better regulation tools have 
already helped the Commission strengthen its accountability vis-à-vis 
stakeholders. We propose several ways to achieve more accountable 
institutions and more widespread evidence-based policy-making. 
This implies, inter alia balancing the efficiency of the policy process 
with its representativeness and legitimacy, improving the dialogue 
with stakeholders and reallocating competences as regards better 
regulation.  
•  Streamlined inter-institutional relations. The co-decision process can 
be made more efficient by a clearer delineation of roles and 
responsibilities within the institutions involved. The extension of the 
Commission’s role in performing impact assessments throughout the 
policy process, as well as the early involvement of the Parliament in 
identifying strategic initiatives in the yearly policy cycle, are 
examples of ideas that respond to this need.  
•  More participation of stakeholders. We can envisage a policy process 
in which all stakeholders are aware of what is being done (and why), 
as well as what is not being done (and why). Consultation on draft 
impact assessments, feedback from national parliaments and 
consultation on regional and local governments will ensure a more 
balanced and effective participation of all stakeholders to EU policy-
making. These tools alone are not enough: they need to be coupled 
with a targeted and well-designed communication campaign to make 
sure they are really used by all stakeholders involved.  
•  Less burdensome legislation. Achieving the Internal Market chiefly 
requires the lifting of unnecessary obstacles to cross-border trade. The 
elimination of administrative burdens is only a piece in a more 
complex puzzle: more harmonised legislation in a number of fields 
can help unleash the potential for the supply and provision of pan-
European goods and services to the ultimate benefit of European 
citizens and consumers. This implies a better use of regulation, 
including forms of self- and co-regulation, where appropriate.  POLICY-MAKING IN THE EU | v 
•  A ‘holistic’, multi-level view of the policy cycle. Policy learning and 
adaptation can be improved in Brussels and in the member states. We 
propose arrangements aimed at ensuring that the efforts made at 
early policy stages lead to ex post monitoring and evaluation of the 
performance of policies, and this feedback can be used to improve EU 
policies overtime.  
In the following pages, we summarise the main policy 
recommendations that emerged from the three expert group meetings by 
proposing 30 ideas for a modernised European Union. Most of these ideas 
look at the internal functioning and external accountability of EU 
institutions, but some of them also refer to tasks that should be 
accomplished by member states, reflecting the idea that better EU policy is 
a shared responsibility. At the end of this report, we also provide more 
forward-looking ideas, resulting from discussion between CEPS staff and 
the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise, on how to fully achieve the 
Internal Market and eliminate all harmful barriers to cross-border trade 
and consumption in the territory of the Union. These ideas are offered as a 
contribution from the research and the business world for a better 
functioning Union in the 21st century. 
Part I. More Efficient Decision-Making by the EU Institutions 
The European Commission of the 21st century: Towards a real ‘world-class 
administration’ 
Idea #1. A smaller College with broader portfolios 
Problem. The College of Commissioners has gradually lost its capacity to 
vote on controversial proposals. The excessive number of Commissioners 
(one per member state) has led to a significant fragmentation of the 
competences, and accordingly to a less efficient decision-making process.  
Suggestions. For this reason, the number of Commissioners should be 
reduced, and each of them should be given a rather broad and – where 
relevant – horizontal portfolio. For example, Commissioners for 
‘Competitiveness’, for ‘Climate Change’ or for ‘Quality of Legislation’ 
should be appointed. This would provide an incentive for national 
governments to propose strong personalities for the College and would 
give the Commission more visibility on these high-level issues. This also 
calls for allocating the necessary resources to these posts from different 
DGs, which implies a more flexible allocation of staff and resources. Future 
EU Presidencies should seek agreement on potential ways to achieve this vi | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
result, proposing forms of ‘egalitarian rotation’ between member states and 
linking horizontal portfolios to goals and targets set at political level for the 
post-Lisbon era.  
 
Idea #2. Alternative ways to improve the internal efficiency of the College 
of Commissioners 
Problem.  Reducing the size of the College may prove very difficult for 
political reasons. In that case, the Commission could consider other ways of 
ensuring its capacity to agree on internally controversial proposals.  
Suggestions. Potentially valid options include: 
•  Reinforcing coordinating structures within the Commission, with 
horizontal issues coming under the direct supervision of the 
President of the Commission.  
•  Creating an ‘inner circle’ of Vice-Presidents. This implies the creation of 
five or six thematic ‘clusters’ of Commissioners, with each of these 
clusters coming under the responsibility of a Vice-President. This 
would combine the advantages of each nationality keeping a high-
level interlocutor with a more workable size of the College. It would 
not necessitate a Treaty change and could go as far as giving the 
respective Vice-President the ultimate say on whether a proposal will 
be presented to the College.  
 
Idea #3. Better use of preparatory documents  
Problem.  The Commission must guide the debate with a view to the 
‘Community interest’, while ensuring that the essentials of its proposals are 
acceptable to all relevant actors. In the preparatory stage of legislation, 
good ‘quality’ particularly implies the setting of clear strategic objectives 
for legislation and extensive consultation. A thorough reflection process 
preceding legislative action is of key importance for a better outcome and 
due to strategic objectives, the actual legislative process can run more 
smoothly later on, similarly to the business sector, where a process ‘from 
strategy to concept to product’ is common.  
Suggestions. Early-stage policy documents (such as Green and White 
Papers) should contain a thorough discussion of: i) the need to act, ii) the 
need to act at EU level and iii) possible policy scenarios and proportionality 
of available regulatory options (including self- and co-regulation). 
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Idea #4. High linguistic and legal drafting quality 
Problem.  Legislative proposals are normally not written by specialist 
drafters and the Commission’s legal service often only comes in at a later 
stage to review the text. In many cases non-native speakers are drafting the 
proposals in English or French, so that an additional linguistic challenge 
exists. With 23 official languages now, it is very important that the original 
language version of a proposal is of great linguistic and legal clarity, so that 
the subsequent translations do not end in ‘Chinese whispers’. 
Suggestions. It should become a standard that both a legal expert and 
a mother-tongue speaker are involved by the lead-DG further ‘upstream’ in 
the drafting process. The same considerations should also apply for the 
other institutions later in the legislative process. 
The European Parliament: Managing Diversity, Increasing Legitimacy 
Idea #5. A code of conduct for tabling amendments 
Problem.  With currently 785 members, the European Parliament is the 
largest directly elected parliament in the world: the size of the Parliament is 
a problem in terms of effective policy-making. Most of the actual work is 
done at committee level, and the number of amendments tabled has 
consequently skyrocketed. With a total of 10,767 plenary amendments 
issued in 2006 alone, concerns had been voiced that the debate would 
become too technical and difficult to follow. Currently the EP President can 
mandate that lead-committees act as ‘filters’ if more than 50 non-committee 
amendments have been tabled: any amendment that does not receive 
favourable votes from at least 1/10 of the committee members will not be 
put to the vote in plenary. 
Suggestions.  The EP-internal Working Party on Parliamentary 
Reform (WPPR) already recommended making it obligatory for the 
responsible committee to ‘filter’ amendments, if they exceed a certain 
number, but the Conference of Presidents did not follow this 
recommendation. This proposal should be reconsidered, as it would help 
focus the parliamentary debate and avoid repetitions and inconsistencies of 
the EP position at an early stage. It would also be beneficial to the quality of 
the legislative text. A code of conduct could be considered that would 
outline criteria for tabling amendments.  
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Idea #6. Involving the European Parliament more heavily in the selection 
of key initiatives to be included in the annual work programme 
Problem.  After the 2004 “Inter-Institutional Agreement on Better 
Lawmaking”, the European Parliament is in charge of performing impact 
assessment whenever it wants to significantly amend Commission 
proposals. However, this feature of the EU’s better regulation system is not 
working, and is unlikely to become more effective in the future. Moreover, 
the Parliament is not heavily involved in the early stage of the policy 
process, when key initiatives to be included in the annual work programme 
are selected.  
Suggestions.  The European Parliament should not be required to 
perform impact assessments on its own amendments. While the 
Commission should take over the competence for updating IAs based on 
proposed amendments, MEPs should be more heavily involved at an early 
stage in the selection of ‘strategic’ proposals to be subjected to in-depth IAs 
in the Commission’s annual legislative and work programme 
(‘Roadmaps’). This feature strengthens and streamlines the inter-
institutional relationship between the two institutions, as the Parliament 
would be called to indicate the issues that should be subject to technical 
analysis (the impact assessment), and would then decide (also) on the basis 
of such analysis when it comes to voting on Commission proposals.  
The Council of Ministers and the European Council: Ensuring Coherence 
and Continuity 
Idea #7. Streamlining negotiations: Issue papers, negotiating boxes and 
sub-groups 
Problem.  The Council is the institution most affected by the ‘effect of 
numbers’ following enlargement, and the shift from 15 to 27 national 
delegations has meant a major change for intergovernmental negotiations. 
The overall legislative output of the Council has remained stable while 
difficulties in reaching agreement can particularly be observed in areas 
where unanimity prevails (e.g. Justice and Home Affairs, General Affairs). 
Recent research found that legislative acts have on average become longer 
by 15%, thus signalling a need to accommodate a greater number of 
national reservations.  
Suggestions.  The Council should give discussions more focus and 
structure by making more use of initial documents where the main 
problematic points are outlined (‘issue papers’); and documents in which the POLICY-MAKING IN THE EU | ix 
presidency lists contentious points, suggested solutions plus the respective 
state of play, to be subject to constant revision tracking the progress of the 
negotiations (‘negotiating boxes’). The general use of these two instruments 
may necessitate special training for those officials from the Presidency or 
the Secretariat General that would be involved in drafting issue papers and 
updating negotiation boxes. Moreover, the use of sub-groups of national 
delegations should be increased to clarify contentious issues before decisions 
are taken in the plenary. These groups could have different functions 
ranging from the simple exploration of an issue to pre-negotiations. The 
sub-groups would not take any decisions and they would be guided and 
supervised by the Presidency, the Council’s Secretariat General and the 
Commission. However, the acceptance of this approach will largely depend 
on the level of trust between member states and the skills of the Presidency 
in maintaining this trust. 
 
Idea #8. Reduce the number of meetings 
Problem. During six-monthly presidencies, a number of official Council 
meetings are organised for political or prestige reasons, but too often result 
in a mere ‘tour de table’, which makes meetings lengthy and unappealing.  
Suggestions. Official meetings should only take place if the legislative 
agenda justifies them and not because the Presidency would like to hold 
them for political or prestige reasons. Unofficial meetings focusing on topical 
issues in given policy areas can be far more effective in stimulating political 
ownership and mutual trust at the national level. In contrast to an official 
meeting with an unappealing formal agenda in Brussels, meetings could 
take place in the country of the Presidency. This approach could be 
considered for the European Council, where two out of the four meetings 
per year could be turned into informal summits.  
 
Idea #9. More focused Presidency conclusions 
Problem. The Presidency conclusions of European summits should become 
more focused and consistent with the role of the European Council as a 
provider of political orientation for the EU-27. At present the text is often 
unduly long and contains many general statements that dilute the key 
messages. 
Suggestions. One option would be to limit the length of the text, e.g. 
to a maximum of 10 pages. Another possibility would be to split the text 
into a short main part and a second, more general part. x | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Idea #10. Coordination of different Council formations  
Problems. Due to its organisational structure, the Council is particularly 
dependent on good coordination mechanisms. The fact that the Council 
meets in nine different formations inevitably means a risk of incoherence. 
Particularly in countries with coalition governments and relatively weak 
coordination mechanisms, national positions are not always fully consistent 
across Council formations. As such it can happen that a member state takes 
a different position in one Council formation (e.g. the Environment 
Council) than it does in another one (e.g. the Competitiveness Council). 
This can lead to confusion among other delegations and to procedural 
delays. Another challenge is the rotation of the Council Presidency. It leads 
to discontinuity, as Presidency staff and political priorities change every six 
months. If the Treaty of Lisbon should enter into force, the number of 
Council formations will remain almost the same and the rotation scheme 
will be maintained for all Council formations except for Foreign Affairs (to 
be chaired by the new ‘double hat’ High Representative) as well as for the 
European Council (with a permanent chair for 2½ years). This means that 
the current problems are also likely to persist in the future. At this point it 
remains unclear what the impact of a General Affairs Council (GAC), 
separated from the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) will be. In a ‘worst case 
scenario’ it will give rise to a structural conflict about competences between 
the two Council formations, for example on preparations for the Heads of 
State meetings with their counterparts from Russia, the US or China. In that 
case the new provisions could lead to a less coherent picture of the EU 
towards outside partners and would create a need for very clear rules of 
procedure.  
Suggestions.  The General Affairs Council (GAC) should determine 
the role of other Council formations concerning important pieces of 
legislation or legislative packages that touch upon several policy areas 
without clear emphasis. ‘Jumbo Councils’ (i.e. joint meetings of different 
formations) should be avoided in the future, as their sheer size makes them 
difficult to handle. Instead, ‘ad hoc working parties’ should be extended. 
This means that the number of participants per delegation is strictly 
limited, but it remains up to the national level to decide who participates 
and speaks as a representative of the respective member state.  
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Part II. More Accountable EU Institutions through Better 
Regulation and Timely Consultation 
Idea #11. In-depth IAs on ‘strategic’ initiatives 
Problem.  The number of impact assessments (IAs) performed by the 
Commission has been constantly increasing since 2003, but resources 
allocated to this task appear rather constant. This increased effort requires a 
more careful application of the principle of proportionate analysis, in order 
to avoid that Commission DGs end up being so time-constrained that their 
work becomes a mere ‘box-ticking’ exercise.  
Suggestions.  The Commission should perform in-depth IAs on a 
limited number of key ‘strategic’ initiatives, and less detailed IAs on other 
initiatives included in the Legislative and Work Programme. The ‘strategic’ 
initiatives that undergo in-depth IA would be selected with a strong 
involvement of the Parliament (see idea #6 above). 
 
Idea #12. The European Commission should perform and update its IAs 
throughout the policy cycle  
Problem. While the Commission has significantly increased its efforts in 
performing IAs on its own major proposals, the same has not occurred for 
the European Parliament and the Council. These two institutions are 
currently required to perform IAs on major amendments, under the 2003 
“Inter-Institutional Agreement on Better Lawmaking” and the 2005 
“Common Approach to Impact Assessment”. However, their use of IA has 
been very limited to date, and there seem to be no prospects for significant 
developments in the future.  
Suggestion.  The Commission should perform IAs on ‘strategic’ 
initiatives throughout the policy cycle, including the co-decision procedure. 
This implies that the European Commission assists other EU institutions in 
assessing the likely impact of major proposed amendments, and then 
revises the original IA document according to the amendments approved. 
In other words, the IA should become a ‘live’ document, which follows the 
iter of the proposal and is always updated, in order to enable evidence-
based decision-making from the beginning until the approval of the final 
text. This way, the IA will also become a valuable document for member 
states in the transposition and implementation of EU legislation.  
 
 xii | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Idea #13. The Commission should publish draft IAs for consultation 
Problem. Expanded competences and powers of the Commission call for a 
stronger oversight on the quality of the Commission IAs. The creation of an 
external or internal ‘watchdog’ in charge of overseeing the Commission’s 
impact assessment work has been raised on several occasions by academics 
and industry representatives over the past few years. After the creation of 
the Impact Assessment Board, an internal body in charge of quality control, 
the average quality of Commission IAs seems to have improved. However, 
if the Commission is called to perform IA on Parliament and Council 
amendments, stronger external oversight should also be guaranteed. 
Discussion in our expert group on better regulation led to the conclusion 
that a new agency in charge of oversight would not be needed, if other 
mechanisms are in place, which could enable consultation of stakeholders 
on the IA document itself, and not only on the final proposal.  
Suggestions.  The need for oversight should be achieved by i) 
strengthening the resources available to the Impact Assessment Board, and 
ii) mandating that the Commission publishes the draft IA on ‘strategic 
initiatives’ before the IAB opinion, in order to allow for further input and 
comments from stakeholders as regards the methodology used and the 
results obtained.  
 
Idea #14. The Commission should plan IA work efficiently 
Problem. Impact Assessment often revolves around the problem of ‘asking 
the right questions, at the right time, and in the right sequence’. As the 
Commission performs IA at different stages of the policy cycle (e.g. White 
Papers, Communications, Directives), it is absolutely essential to avoid 
repetitions in the IA documents. Likewise, it is crucial that the Commission 
addresses the right questions at the right time: for example, the 
Commission should provide at a very early stage the answer to questions 
such as: “Would an intervention improve upon the status quo?” Or, “Is 
intervention at EU level needed?” On the other hand, a detailed cost-
benefit analysis is normally not needed when regulatory alternatives are 
still far from being precisely defined.  
Suggestions. The IA work done at an early stage of the policy process 
(e.g. on a White Paper) should form the basis for an incremental IA done at 
subsequent stages. The planning of IA work should form part of the 
preliminary stages of the policy cycle, and include an indication of when 
and how specific tasks will be performed. For example, the analysis of the POLICY-MAKING IN THE EU | xiii 
‘zero option’ and the subsidiarity test should normally be performed at 
early stages, whereas detailed, quantitative cost-benefit analysis may be 
more appropriate at later stages, although this decision would have to be 
taken on a case-by-case basis. The IAB is best positioned to advise on early-
stage IA planning.  
 
Idea #15. The Commission should efficiently allocate resources between ex 
ante impact assessment and ex post evaluation  
Problem.  Since the Commission IA system has been in place now since 
2003, the revision of IAs performed and the ex post evaluation of existing 
pieces of legislation will increasingly become important in the years to 
come. It is essential that indicators of regulatory quality and performance 
are used to enable learning and feedback for future policy initiatives. 
Suggestions.  The Commission should expand its use of ex post 
evaluation by linking evaluations to ex ante assessments, and using a set of 
indicators of regulatory quality as well as indicators of the performance of 
the specific regulatory initiative under scrutiny. In performing the ex post 
evaluation, the Commission should consult stakeholders in order to collect 
the necessary information on the compliance with the legislation, as well as 
on the effectiveness of the rules against the initially envisaged results.  
 
Idea #16. The Parliament should act as an ‘informal watchdog’ in the EU 
better regulation system 
Problem.  Better regulation also implies that proposals put forward by 
institutions are sufficiently justified.  In sending its proposals to the 
European Parliament, the Commission should clarify the objectives sought 
and the associated risks, whether through IA or any other statement.  
Suggestions. The European Parliament is normally the first institution 
to vote on Commission proposals, and as such is well positioned to act as 
an informal watchdog. A rule may be established, according to which if a 
majority of MEPs in the lead-committee dealing with the respective 
legislative proposal is of the opinion that the Commission has not been 
sufficiently clear on the objectives of that proposal or that it leaves 
important elements to implementing measures, they could notify the 
Commission President in an open letter and call upon the Commission to 
assume its political responsibilities. 
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Idea #17. The scope and role of the measurement of administrative burdens 
should be clarified 
Problems. The EU-wide measurement of administrative burdens covered 
42 pieces of legislation in 13 priority areas, and measures only the costs 
faced by businesses in complying with information obligations contained in 
relevant legislation. The measurement is well underway and is 
approaching its second phase, with the expansion of the priority areas 
included in the measurement and the adoption of measures aimed at 
cutting red tape. However, the Commission has not yet clarified whether 
the 25% reduction target is ‘net’ (i.e. it includes new measures adopted 
during the reduction period) and whether the measurement will be 
expanded to all the business-relevant acquis. There is also a need to clarify 
the relation between the burdens measurement and the IA system: the 
question has been raised whether resources for burden-reduction exercises 
are crowding out resources for the implementation of IA at the EU and 
member state level. Finally, the scope of the measurement still does not 
include all costs faced by businesses in complying with EU legislation (so-
called ‘compliance costs’), of which administrative burdens are only a 
fraction. 
Suggestions. The Commission must clarify that the 25% target is ‘net’. 
Also, given the narrower focus of the measurement compared to the IA 
exercise, the former should be gradually incorporated into the IA practice: 
in scrutinising IAs, the Impact Assessment Board should request a 
calculation of burdens where absent (and where appropriate). Another 
improvement would be to broaden the scope of the measurement to 
include compliance costs, at least qualitatively. 
 
Idea #18. Use the burdens measurement as a driver for the convergence of 
IA system 
Problem. While impact assessment is seldom implemented in practice at 
national level, virtually all member states have now adopted the Standard 
Cost Model (SCM) as a tool to reduce administrative burdens. Achieving 
better regulation in the EU requires that IA is performed both at EU and 
member state level. This would ensure that episodes of over-
implementation, ‘gold-plating’ and ‘double-banking’  are immediately 
visible, and that the EU can switch gears towards the completion of the 
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Suggestions.  The Action Programme on administrative burdens 
should be used to promote convergence between EU and member states’ 
better regulation agendas, since most member states have undertaken 
SCM-type initiatives, but there are very few examples of implementation of 
complex IA systems similar to the one used by the Commission. The reason 
why the burdens measurement can be taken as a first step is simple: once 
the baseline measurement has been completed, reduction proposals will be 
formulated. In order to understand which proposals are more likely to be 
beneficial for businesses, a fully-fledged impact assessment will be needed. 
This calls for continuity between the measurement of administrative 
burdens and the introduction of impact assessment on national policy 
processes.  
 
Idea #19. A ‘new Mandelkern Group’, with a focus on advancing the EU 
better regulation agenda should be launched 
Problems.  The coming months will coincide with the end of the Lisbon 
strategy and with the 10th anniversary of the appointment of the 
Mandelkern Group on Better Regulation, which laid the foundations of the 
current better regulation agenda in the EU. Today, there is a need to 
carefully rethink the better regulation agenda to pave the way for a more 
coordinated use of better regulation tools (burdens measurement, ex ante 
IA, consultation, ex post evaluation) and for an extension of better 
regulation to member states, where some of the tools are still hardly used.  
Suggestions. The appointed group of experts should be in charge of:  
•  Identifying and communicating a coherent and shared vision of 
better regulation and regulatory quality across the EU and its role in 
the Lisbon agenda after 2010 
•  Evaluating the progress made since 2001 in the member states and at 
the EU level, with the aid of quantitative measurement of the 
adoption-implementation gap and qualitative case studies to shed 
light on the mechanisms of success and failure 
•  Identifying best practice 
•  Comparing strategies of regulatory oversight and making 
suggestions for institutional design, with the aim of increasing the 
credibility and legitimacy of IA at the EU and member state level 
•  Discussing a roadmap towards the convergence of EU and national 
better regulation agendas, including multi-level convergence of IA 
systems. xvi | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Idea #20. A single EU website directed to businesses 
Problem.  The information available on the Internet for businesses is 
fragmented in a myriad of websites and very difficult to gather, especially 
for SMEs. This is particularly important as regards the information on the 
implementation and enforcement of legislation. Apart from the biannual 
Internal Market Scoreboard, since 2000 the Commission publishes every 
two months the data on the progress in the notification of national 
measures implementing directives. The content of this information and the 
way it is presented suffer from important operational pitfalls, and is very 
difficult to exploit by a firm looking for the state of transposition of a 
directive in a specific country.  
Suggestions. It would be advisable to create a multi-lingual website, 
clearly visible and accessible from the Europa portal, with all information 
on business-related policies and initiatives, as well as information on the 
units (or better, persons) responsible for transposing the directives at 
national level and their counterparts in the Commission.  
Part III. The EU and its member states: Better EU Policy is a 
‘Shared Responsibility’ 
EU level tasks 
Idea #21. The Commission should issue practical technical guidelines on 
the application of the subsidiarity principle 
Problems.  In a multi-tier government structure such as the European 
Union, the allocation of public functions must comply with the subsidiarity 
principle as specified in Art. 5 TEC and the Protocol annexed to the 
Amsterdam Treaty, which will be incorporated into the new Lisbon Treaty. 
All institutions are obliged to comply with the subsidiarity principle and 
they are also involved in its application in some form or another. The 
Commission – for instance – must justify every legislative proposal on the 
grounds of subsidiarity and present an annual report that can be assessed 
by the other institutions. The amendments by the Council and the 
European Parliament must also be subsidiarity-compliant. The consultative 
bodies of the EU – the Committee of the Regions (CoR) and the European 
Economic and Social Committee (EESC) – ensure that subsidiarity is 
respected from the point of view of regional and local authorities and civil 
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compliance of Community secondary legislation with subsidiarity. 
Therefore, “the current system puts the burden of proof on the institutions 
involved in the Union’s legislative process”. Since 2005, the Commission 
has streamlined the process by using a common questionnaire on 
subsidiarity and by presenting the information in the same way in every 
proposal. Although formally assessing the ‘necessity’ and ‘need to act in 
common’ are elements of the subsidiarity principle, the questionnaire 
remains vague in some areas. More specifically, there is no mechanism or 
procedure (as is the case for proportionality on the IA guidelines) to 
quantify those elements and the use of quantitative indicators to measure 
cross-border spillovers and externalities remains optional.  
Suggestions. The Commission should prepare specific guidelines that 
may also be used by national parliaments in order to ensure a 
homogeneous treatment of subsidiarity across Europe. Consequently other 
institutions and interested stakeholders will find it much easier to assess 
subsidiarity. More efforts in this sense should be encouraged, especially 
once national parliaments are formally involved in the process. The time is 
ripe for the Commission to develop a more comprehensive system 
involving all interested parties such as the CoR, Conference of Community 
and European Affairs Committees of Parliaments of the European Union 
(COSAC) and the European Parliament. With the assistance of these 
institutions, the Commission should develop specific guidelines for the 
application of subsidiarity that will facilitate the assessment at national and 
regional level and consequently the comparison of results. 
 
Idea #22. Future EU Presidencies should promote the creation of a Task 
Force composed of representatives of the 27 national parliaments. 
Problem. National parliaments will play a more intense role in the years to 
come as regards their contribution to the good functioning of the Union. 
This calls for identifying and sharing best practices on the way in which EU 
affairs are dealt with in national parliaments. A case in point is Sweden, 
where the General EU Affairs Committee that deals with European issues 
within the Swedish Parliament is now complemented by a more 
decentralised approach, in which the relevant Parliamentary Committee 
deals with Green and White Papers, Proposals for Directives or 
Regulations, etc. when presented. This change is aimed at improving the 
awareness of the EU dimension in all policy and legislative areas as well as 
to increase the quality of national contributions in each sector at the EU 
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indicated as a best practice for other countries in search of a new 
institutional arrangement to deal with EU issues. 
Suggestion.  Future Presidencies should promote the creation of a 
Task Force composed of representatives of national parliaments to explore 
and analyse how European affairs are dealt with in each national 
parliament and highlight potential best practices.  
 
Idea #23. Improving information on transposition and implementation: 
Concordance tables 
Problem.  Member states can engage in undesirable practices during the 
transposition phase, such as gold-plating, double-banking or regulatory 
creep, which essentially lead to over-implementation of EU legislation. In 
many instances, it is difficult to trace the exact implementation of the EU 
acquis in national legislation. Some countries adopt specific acts, other 
prefer to amend existing legislation, others split the transposing measures 
in two or more laws or decrees.  
Suggestion.  In order to avoid such practices, the European 
Commission has repeatedly insisted on the need for using and publishing 
concordance tables between the EU legal acts and national transposition 
measures. Our expert groups strongly endorsed this view, and encourage 
the EU Presidency to act in this direction, which would increase the 
transparency of the transposition process and improve the access to and 
understanding of new legislation by all interested parties. 
 
Idea #24. Improving transposition and implementation by creating 
networks of officials 
Problem.  Especially in case of complex pieces of legislation, sharing 
experience and best practices is very important for national legislators in 
charge of implementation. One good example is the Services Directive, 
which enables broad administrative cooperation and mutual evaluation. 
This experience, if successful, could be expanded to other, less complex 
areas of EU legislation. 
Suggestion.  The  creation of  networks of implementing officials 
should be promoted, especially for complex pieces of legislation, as well as 
for all those rules that are particularly subject to over-implementation. 
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Idea #25. Towards the convergence of EU and national IA systems: A 
common set of IA quality indicators 
Problem. Achieving better regulation in the EU is a shared responsibility of 
the EU and member states. The Commission has stated on several occasions 
that member states also have to do their part to improve the quality of 
legislation.  
Suggestion. One initiative that could be endorsed by the future EU 
Presidencies, with the help of a ‘new Mandelkern Group’ (see idea #19 
above), is the adoption of a common set of IA quality indicators for the 27 
member states and the EU institutions, to kick-start a process of facilitated 
coordination and learning among member states. The adoption of a 
common set of measures is an important step to create shared beliefs and 
common progress towards regulatory quality. If supported by a process of 
monitoring and annual discussion of indicators, the set of IA indicators 
would encourage more systematic implementation at the domestic level. 
 
Idea #26. Launch an in-depth screening exercise of national regulations 
that hinder the Internal Market 
Problem.  Especially in  some policy areas, such as intellectual property, 
consumer policy, transport, energy and others, the achievement of the 
Internal Market appears far from complete. The Commission has already 
started reviewing the Single Market and selected a number of sectors to be 
analysed more in-depth. In addition, the awareness of the benefit of some 
EU policies among businesses appears still limited. For example, despite its 
benefits, mutual recognition is generally unknown to European economic 
operators. 
Suggestion.  The current review of the Single Market should be 
extended with a study on national regulations that potentially hinder the 
application of EU legislation and the functioning of the Internal Market. 
This would be useful both for data collection and for awareness-raising 
campaigns. The study should also assess the problems and costs of 
governance of mutual recognition in the services sector.  xx | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Member states’ tasks 
Idea #27. Appoint national coordinators of EU policy 
Problem.  Particularly in countries with coalition governments and 
relatively weak coordination mechanisms, national positions are not 
always fully consistent across Council formations. Accordingly, member 
states may take different positions in different Council formations. This can 
lead to confusion among other delegations and to procedural delays.  
Suggestion.  A coordinator of EU policy who enjoys the necessary 
political backing of the Head of State or Government should be appointed 
in all member states. Ideally, this person would carry the title of Minister 
for European Affairs. In some countries such a position already exists, 
while in others past attempts have failed (particularly in those with 
coalition governments and a strong coordinating role within the Foreign 
Ministry and/or other Ministries). The perspective of a separate General 
Affairs Council (GAC) under the Treaty of Lisbon could be an incentive to 
revive this idea, but even if the treaty may not come into force, member 
states should be encouraged to introduce such a position. This new position 
should be coordinated with the work of the national EU affairs committee 
of each country (idea #22 above). 
 
Idea #28. Create new post for subsidiarity and proportionality in each 
national parliament 
Problem.  Better communication between national parliaments would 
facilitate their role in assessing subsidiarity and to guarantee a 
homogeneous analysis across countries.  
Suggestion. The creation of a position responsible for subsidiarity and 
proportionality in each national parliament would at once ensure regular 
contacts with other national counterparts, and create centralised expertise 
in the application of these two key principles in the drafting, transposition, 
monitoring and evaluation stages. The appointment of a responsible person 
for subsidiarity and proportionality would be important also for the 
effectiveness of the ‘subsidiarity check’ mechanism foreseen by the Protocol 
on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality 
annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon.  
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Idea #29. Implementation plans 
Problem. For the quality and effectiveness of EU rules, the transposition, 
implementation and enforcement of EU legislation at national level are as 
important as the earlier stages of policy formulation. The lack of clear 
information on the way in which individual member states plan to 
transpose and implement legislation can create widely diverging practices 
and problems that could have been prevented beforehand, instead of being 
addressed afterwards.  
Suggestion. A potential innovation at national level is the adoption of 
an ‘implementation plan’ for EU legislation by the national minister in 
charge of a given dossier. The plan should be presented to the national 
parliament and clearly address the following aspects: how the legislation 
will be transposed into national law; whether it would require new 
primary legislation or amendments to the existing one; whether special 
implementation measures are needed; how legislation will be enforced; 
whether penalties will be linked to non-observance. If this plan were to be 
drafted and shared with the European Commission, this could also prevent 
the emergence of problems in the subsequent transposition phase: as a 
matter of fact, our expert group participants suggested that the early 
involvement of national implementation officials can lead to the prevention 
of transposition problems in a timely and efficient manner.  
 
Idea #30. Create specialised divisions within SOLVIT 
Problem.  The latest report on the performance of the SOLVIT network 
shows a clear increase in the number of cases addressed. The incredible 
increase in the number of cases submitted by citizens with respect to 
businesses is further proof of the success of the network and a interesting 
reflection of what appear to be the more problematic areas (according to 
the number of cases submitted), such as social security and professional 
qualifications. The success of SOLVIT is mainly due to the high resolution 
rates and its rapidity. Yet, the data still reflect a potential for additional use 
of the network.  
Suggestion. If this trend persists, it might be wise to create specialised 
divisions within SOLVIT to ensure an efficient treatment of every case 
independently of the case submitter. Also, the large number of non-
SOLVIT cases received should encourage member states to create similar 
structures to address problems with national legislation. Finally, 
cooperation between administrations across member states should be 
further encouraged to bring down the remaining resistances of some 
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Conclusion – The way forward: Boosting long-term European 
Competitiveness 
The previous sections have sketched out the 30 ideas discussed by our 
three expert groups for improving the quality of EU legislation. Most of 
these ideas can be tackled in the short term, as they require no Treaty 
change, and are addressed at the upcoming EU Presidencies as suggestions 
to shape the European Union of the future. Our suggestions aim at 
transforming Europe into a community in which a world-class 
administration (the Commission) leads political agents (the Parliament, the 
Council, national parliaments, implementing officials) towards the 
achievement of real better regulation, to the benefit of society as a whole; a 
community in which dialogue between the EU and member state level 
finally relies on the same language – the language of better regulation; and 
a community in which businesses face lower compliance costs, and have 
easy access to institutions when compliance becomes a problem. We 
believe that implementing these ideas could significantly improve the 
effectiveness of EU policy, to the benefits of all Europeans. In this context, it 
is worth recalling that the Single Market with its four freedoms of 
movement is the core of the European project: this should be taken as a 
starting point for any reform effort, as completion of the Single Market will 
deliver benefits in other areas.  
In particular, when looking forward to the post-Lisbon decade, the 
EU should also do more in terms of eliminating barriers to the Internal 
Market, by identifying and removing inconsistent legislation in member 
states and thus facilitating cross-border operations by businesses and 
consumers. We believe that this objective could be achieved only if the 
harmonisation of legislation is given a more prominent role in the EU 
debate, both at the policy formulation stage, and in the implementation at 
national level. Businesses, and especially SMEs, need harmonised rules to 
cross their national borders and become real EU players. In the long run, 
the resulting increased competition and variety of products would 
enormously benefit European consumers.  
Looking at Europe in a few years from now, the current patchwork of 
national rules should be replaced by a set of common rules and standards. 
In order to achieve this goal, legislation should be harmonised in stages, 
starting from the areas in which rules differ without any overarching 
reason. Accordingly, the Commission’s initiative of reviewing the Single 
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identification of areas where harmonisation is needed, and that this in turn 
leads to policy action to remove barriers.  
Will this be enough? We suspect not. Too often the harmonisation of 
legislation is hampered by national prerogatives and the need to protect 
domestic firms. Advocating a smooth transition towards harmonised rules 
in key policy domains is simply utopia, as of today. As long as national 
interests remain a real bottleneck – for example, in Council negotiations – 
this process may never be completed. Currently, EU institutions can decide 
not to harmonise legislation in certain fields without actually providing any 
justification. At a minimum, we believe that EU institutions should justify 
their decision not to remove barriers to the Internal Market when they take 
action to formulate new legislation or review existing legislation. This is 
why we propose to ‘reverse the burden of proof’, by establishing a 
presumption that new EU rules in areas in need of harmonisation should in 
principle be regulations, or directives that leave very limited discretion to 
member states in the implementation phase.  
In practice, the implementation of this vision means following a 
number of steps: 
•  Review the stock of legislation and identify areas where 
harmonisation is needed. This is what the Commission has started to 
do within the framework of the Single Market Review, and should be 
expanded and transformed into an in-depth screening process (idea 
#26 above). But sectoral analyses should be presented together with a 
clear description of the baseline: such description can be used as ‘zero 
option’ in future impact assessment work.  
•  For these areas, ‘reverse the burden of proof’. This means that the 
Commission introduces in the IA guidelines a new ‘harmonisation 
test’ (or a ‘modified subsidiarity test’), where the burden of proof is 
on the Commission to depart from regulations to adopt more flexible 
instruments. Of course, this approach should be adopted only once 
the need for action has been adequately justified (as already occurs in 
Commission impact assessments). In a nutshell, if the Commission 
wants to adopt a directive in an area where harmonisation has been 
considered necessary (e.g. privacy legislation), then the Commission 
services in charge of the IA would have to make the case for such a 
choice. If they fail, the IAB should oblige them to revise the IA or 
propose the adoption of a different instrument. This system can be 
adapted and refined. For example, besides calling for more 
regulations, it can also apply to the degree of flexibility left by xxiv | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
directives to member states, so that the rules are as harmonised as 
possible, unless there is evidence that more flexibility would bring a 
clear added value. For example, in some cases mutual learning and 
competition between legal systems may lead to a ‘race to the top’ that 
the Commission could never achieve.  
•  Add new areas. Once the process has started, new sectoral analyses 
should be launched to complete the Single Market Review, leading to 
more baselines to be used as a starting point for the harmonisation of 
legislation. This ensures that EU institutions and member states keep 
the momentum in overcoming harmful discrepancies in national 
legislation.  
•  Constantly monitor legislation. The use of ex post evaluation should 
become more widespread and important, so that areas in which 
barriers to the Internal Market are not gradually removed are kept 
under constant scrutiny and are potentially subject to further 
intervention. In doing this, the use of indicators appears of utmost 
importance: in particular, efforts should be devoted to developing 
both indicators of governance and regulatory quality; and indicators 
that focus on the daily life of businesses, which provide a clear 
picture of the remaining ‘cost of non-Europe’ from the perspective of 
operators. The latter indicators can be derived from the expansion of 
the Standard Cost Model to compliance costs; as well as by 
improving upon the concept of ‘doing business’ indicators currently 
used by the World Bank.  
This long-term strategy crucially depends on the implementation of 
many of the suggestions we have identified. For example:  
•  An effective presumption in favour of harmonisation in certain policy 
domains becomes possible only if the Commission updates the IA for 
major proposals after they are amended by the Parliament and the 
Council (idea #12). This way, if MEPs or national governments resist 
the achievement of the Internal Market by amending Commission 
proposals in a less ‘Europe-ist’ way, they would have to do so against 
the evidence brought by the Commission, which points to a need for 
harmonising rules.  
•  The expansion of the Standard Cost Model to compliance costs (idea 
#17) can help the Commission and member states in identifying areas 
where the daily life of a business (and later, possibly also citizens) is 
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of cases in which the costs and patterns of compliance with EU 
legislation widely differ throughout the territory of the EU.  
•  The possibility for businesses to present evidence of the need for 
harmonisation during a consultation on draft IAs (idea #13) is key for 
establishing a climate in which priority is given to the Single Market. 
In many cases, large and small businesses know better than 
legislators where the potential for abating barriers lies, and are able to 
provide evidence of the potential benefits of further harmonisation.  
•  Convergence between EU and national better regulation strategies 
(idea #18) ensures that the efforts made in improving the quality of 
EU legislation are not lost due to a patchy and widely diverging 
transposition and implementation. The same can be said for the 
establishment of a common set of indicators (idea #25), as well as for 
the appointment of national coordinators of EU policy (idea #27).  
•  The increased use of ex post evaluation (idea #15) is necessary for the 
monitoring of the performance of individual pieces of legislation, 
especially if coupled with the use of indicators. In this respect, the 
availability of concordance tables (idea #23) significantly facilitates 
the monitoring phase.  
•  The adoption of practical technical guidelines on subsidiarity can 
significantly prevent the risk of over-implementation (idea #21), 
especially if coupled with the appointment of responsible persons or 
subsidiarity and proportionality in national parliaments (idea #28), 
and the creation of networks of implementing officials for complex 
pieces of legislation (idea #24). The same can be said for the Task 
Force of representatives of national parliaments (idea #22).  
Finally, from the perspective of businesses, the availability of a single 
website for businesses containing, i.a. information on the implementation of 
legislation and responsible officials in member states (idea #20) can prove 
particularly effective in increasing the degree of awareness of certain EU 
policies. Should problems emerge, a more effective and specialised SOLVIT 
can help businesses in filing complaints and find an effective solution in a 
short timeframe (idea #30).  
| 1 
POLICY-MAKING IN THE EU 
ACHIEVEMENTS, CHALLENGES AND 
PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
MAIN REPORT 
ith the EU and its member states facing increasingly strong 
competition from other countries such as India and China, there 
is also growing concern about the European Union’s 
competitiveness in a globalised world. The EU integration process has been 
a driving force for innovation, but in recent years European decision-
making has often been criticised as slow, complex and producing too many 
‘lowest common denominator’-solutions.1 Additionally, European 
companies still face several obstacles when operating within the EU; and 
citizens continue to feel distant from the EU’s political processes, which 
undermines the legitimacy of many decisions. This lack of ownership in the 
Union was most recently underlined again by the Irish no-vote to the 
Lisbon Treaty, but is also reflected in the low turnouts for European 
Parliament elections which have been decreasing constantly since the first 
direct elections in 1979.  
Moreover, while the European Union and its member states have 
taken important steps towards improving the quality of legislation and 
more generally the regulatory environment for European citizens and 
businesses, several areas still exhibit room for improvement. This is 
particularly true in the case of the EU Internal Market, one of the core 
pillars of European integration, which in turn brings to the fore the 
question of the respective role of the EU and its member states in shaping 
and implementing present and future goals of the European project. 
                                                      
1 For a recent contribution to the academic debate on the deficits of EU decision-
making see Fritz W. Scharpf (2006), “The Joint Decision Trap Revisited”, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, Vol. 44, No. 4, pp. 845-864. 
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It is in this context that the present report has been drafted. The text is 
the product of a joint project initiated by the Confederation of Swedish 
Enterprise and the Centre for European Policy Studies. Chapters 1, 2 and 3 
are based on the findings of three Expert Groups composed by experts 
from EU institutions (the European Commission, the European Parliament, 
the Council, the Committee of the Regions and the Economic and Social 
Committee), former high-level EU officials, authoritative academics and 
practitioners, senior officials of international organisations, and experts 
from national better regulation units. The project was structured along 
three main pillars (‘EU decision-making’, ‘Better Regulation’, and 
‘Implementation and Subsidiarity’).  
In Chapter 4, we provide more forward-looking ideas, resulting from 
discussion between CEPS staff and the Confederation of Swedish 
Enterprise, on how to fully achieve the Internal Market and eliminate all 
harmful barriers to cross-border trade and consumption in the territory of 
the Union. These ideas are offered as a contribution from the research and 
the business world for a better functioning Union in the 21st century. 
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1.  THE FUTURE OF 
EU DECISION-MAKING 
SEBASTIAN KURPAS
∗ & PIOTR MACIEJ KACZYŃSKI 
he Expert Group on the Future of EU Decision-Making has looked at 
the EU decision-making cycle, with special emphasis on the 
preparatory phase and the legislative negotiations.2 In this chapter 
we identify existing problems in the internal processes of EU institutions, in 
the inter-institutional relations between EU institutions and in the 
interaction of the EU institutions with other actors. We look first at the 
European Commission, then at the Council of Ministers (and the European 
Council) and finally at the European Parliament. In addition, we look at the 
key role played by national administrations in the context of the Council of 
Ministers, as well as the important contribution of national parliaments to 
the shaping of EU legislation.  
In each section, we first describe the key challenges for the institution 
at hand, and then address a number of more concrete challenges ahead, 
leading to recommendations for improvement. For each challenge, the 
respective scope (internal, inter-institutional, interaction with other actors) 
and the stage of the decision-making cycle (preparatory, negotiations or 
implementation) are indicated. Recommendations are then classified 
according to the type of proposal. Most recommendations fall into the 
categories of formal rules (e.g. rules of procedure of a given institution) or 
                                                      
∗ This chapter was drafted in the rapporteur’s former capacity as Head of CEPS 
Politics and Institutions research unit and Research Fellow. 
2 The implementation phase is also touched upon, but has been addressed in much 
greater detail in Chapter 3 on implementation and subsidiarity. 
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informal practices (e.g. norms, working methods). Treaty change has been 
proposed in only one case.  
1.1  What do we mean by ‘quality of decision-making’? 
We define ‘quality’ as a function of three different elements: i) problem-
solving capacity, i.e. achievement of initial objectives; ii) efficiency, i.e. ease 
of adoption and implementation of decisions; and iii) representativeness, 
i.e. sufficient and appropriate input from stakeholders and involvement of 
the general public.  
These three elements are not always complementary, and in some 
cases they may even conflict. For example, an efficient procedure would 
generally entail adoption and implementation of a legislative act with as 
little delay as possible; however, this must be weighed against concerns 
about the problem-solving capacity of the legislation, as well as the 
representativeness of the process. In some cases, additional time may be 
justified, if the benefits of consulting stakeholders and the general public 
more-than-compensate the cost of lengthier procedures. More generally, 
there is no ‘golden rule’ as to which of the three quality determinants 
should prevail over others. 
Building on the concept of ‘decision-making cycle’, the different 
stages call for a different focus when it comes to defining quality. In the 
preparatory stage, ‘good quality’ implies the setting of clear strategic 
objectives for legislation and extensive consultation. A thorough reflection 
process preceding legislative action is of key importance for a better 
outcome and, due to strategic objectives, the actual legislative process can 
run more smoothly later on, similarly to the business sector where a 
process from ‘strategy to concept to product’ is common. Concerning the 
phase of legislative negotiations, ‘quality’ is defined by the problem-solving 
capacity and the effective acceptance of the outcome by stakeholders. The 
measures proposed in a legislative act must address previously identified 
problems and these measures must find the support of those who are 
directly affected by them. During the implementing stage, ‘quality’ implies 
that a legislative act has to be relatively easy to put in place and may not 
cause a great demand for subsequent clarification or even litigation. 
Administrative burdens are to be kept to a minimum and need to be 
weighed against concrete benefits that the measure will bring. 
Consequently, the following five elements should be understood as 
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1.  A clear identification of the needs and objectives that justify a legislative 
initiative. 
2.  A good technical grasp of the matter and focused work towards 
substantive answers for the identified problems (‘technical 
preparedness’). 
3.  A thorough understanding of the concerns about the proposed 
solutions that may exist in the different national contexts (‘political 
preparedness’). 
4.  Communication of (the essentials of) the agreed solutions in a way that 
is understandable for the wider public. 
5.  The  capacity to detect shortcomings throughout the decision-making 
process and feed ‘lessons learned’ into future decision-making (thus 
turning the ‘process’ into a ‘cycle’). 
In addition, the quality of decision-making also depends on political 
leadership and a genuine willingness to cooperate among key actors. Such 
a spirit of ‘give and take’ is a core factor for successful decision-making, but 
can hardly be ensured through rules of procedure or guidelines. A positive 
example in this respect has been the recent agreement during first reading 
on the legislative package concerning the free movement of goods (so-
called ‘goods-package’).3 According to interviews conducted for this report, 
all relevant actors representing the Commission, Council and European 
Parliament had demonstrated their flexibility and openness to compromise 
during these negotiations, with the result of a quick and meaningful 
                                                      
3 Official Journal of the European Union, L 218, Vol. 51, 13 August 2008 (http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:218:SOM:en:HTML): 
-  Regulation (EC) No 764/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
9 July 2008 laying down procedures relating to the application of certain 
national technical rules to products lawfully marketed in another member state 
and repealing Decision No 3052/95/EC (1); 
-  Regulation (EC) No 765/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
9 July 2008 setting out the requirements for accreditation and market 
surveillance relating to the marketing of products and repealing Regulation 
(EEC) No 339/93 (1); 
-  Decision No 768/2008/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 
July 2008 on a common framework for the marketing of products, and repealing 
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agreement.4 Much depends thus on building momentum in the process, so 
that all actors understand the benefits of reaching agreement. 
1.2  The European Commission: Need for leadership and public 
acceptance 
The European Commission is the ‘guardian of the treaties’, as it defines and 
defends the Community interest and ensures the proper implementation of 
EU policy. Its institutional self-understanding has traditionally been that of 
a politically neutral and expertise-driven bureaucracy, despite its important 
political and agenda-setting functions. Since the beginning of the 1990s, the 
hybrid nature of the Commission has become more problematic due to an 
increasingly critical public demanding a stronger democratic legitimacy of 
the Commission’s actions.5 This trend is reflected in the growing party-
political criticism of the Commission: on the political left the Commission is 
portrayed as a proponent of ‘ultra liberal’ policies that neglects social 
aspects, while critics from the political right tend to present it as a tireless 
producer of regulations that ignores business interests. 
The dual challenge for the Commission is therefore the preservation 
of its capacity to provide political leadership in the Community interest on 
the one hand, while finding public acceptance for its actions on the other. 
1.2.1  Improvement of legislative proposals 
With its monopoly on legislative initiatives in the first pillar, the European 
Commission has an important agenda-setting function and plays a key role 
in the preparatory phase of legislation. The Commission’s White Papers 
and Green Papers are crucial documents in which the strategic objectives 
for envisaged legislation can be presented and developed. Over recent 
years, there has already been a clear trend towards a more careful testing of 
the grounds before a legislative proposal is put forward, but room for 
                                                      
4 According to the stakeholder organisation of the retail, wholesale and 
international trade sectors, EuroCommerce, the goods package has been “a good 
example of speed in legislating” (http://www.eurocommerce.be/content.aspx? 
PageId=41159). 
5 For an overview of the academic debate, see Dionyssis Dimatrakopoulos and 
Argyris Passas (2004), “Governing without government?”, in Dionyssis 
Dimatrakopoulos (ed.), The Changing European Commission, Manchester: 
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improvement remains.6 In some cases, Green Papers and White Papers 
remain too general and are not sufficiently clear about the actual problems 
and preferred solutions. Similarly, legislative proposals sometimes leave 
key aspects open, so that they have to be elaborated by the Council and the 
European Parliament or even during the implementing stage by 
comitology committees.  
Box 1.1 Preparing legislative packages: Good and bad cases 
A positive example of a well-prepared package of legislative initiatives is the 
electronic communications framework (Directive 2002/21/EC). It was 
agreed in 2002 and preceded by a Commission Green Paper that set out in 
detail the basis for the legislation and presented very clearly the objectives 
and the proposed structure for future legislation. The legislative proposals 
included all essential elements. The Commission had clearly defined the 
objective (i.e. eliminating competitive dysfunctions in the telecoms sector 
due to a number of dominant players) and the measures to be taken (i.e. the 
establishment of a network of authorities that would analyse the market and 
have powers to intervene against anti-competition conditions). This greatly 
helped to put the debate on a concrete track for a constructive solution, 
which was acceptable to all major players. When it came to negotiations in 
the Council and the EP, the basic structures for a solution had largely been 
accepted and the debate could be based on this common ground.  
In contrast, the Commission’s preparatory documents for the current 
reform of the telecoms package have been more ambiguous on the main 
problems and appropriate solutions. According to observers, the 2006 
Commission review of the existing legislation lacked concrete proposals on 
key points, for example on the usefulness of a central European 
telecommunications authority or on the next generation of telecoms 
investments and some key options in the proposal were not subjected to 
consultation. These shortcomings backfired and caused mistrust among the 
political actors, leading to a very difficult composition of interests in second 
reading (still ongoing). 
There have been calls in the past for an external body in charge of 
ensuring the quality of Commission proposals. To some degree, such an 
                                                      
6 See for example Anna Michalski (2002), Governing Europe: The Future Role of the 
European Commission, The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations – 
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external control may come into being, if national parliaments build up the 
necessary capacity for an effective ‘subsidiarity check’, as foreseen by the 
Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality to 
the Treaty of Lisbon.7 If a proposal is not sufficiently concrete on the means 
of intervention and the expected consequences, national parliaments may 
stand up to highlight conflicts with the subsidiarity principle. The protocol 
foresees two different scenarios: 
a.  If one-third of the votes accorded to national parliaments (i.e. 2 per 
member state) support a reasoned opinion indicating a breach of the 
principle of subsidiarity, the Commission must review its proposal. 
After the review, the Commission may maintain the proposal, but it 
has to give a reasoned opinion for its decision. 
b.  If a majority of the votes accorded to national parliaments indicates a 
breach of the subsidiarity principle, the Commission can still 
maintain its proposal, but under the co-decision procedure (or 
‘ordinary legislative procedure’ according to the Treaty of Lisbon) the 
reasoned opinion of the national parliaments and the one of the 
Commission will be submitted to the Council and the EP for 
consideration before the first reading. If then a majority of 55% of 
member states in the Council or a majority of the votes cast in the EP 
indicate that the proposal is not compatible with the principle of 
subsidiarity, it will not be considered. 
It remains to be seen how effective this control mechanism will be in 
practice. Its impact will largely depend on the capacity of national 
parliaments to organise themselves and table their reasoned opinion within 
the obligatory 8-week period.  
1.2.1.1  Recommendations 
The Commission must use its preparatory documents to present all 
relevant alternatives during the consultation phase. It has the most 
resources and staff, and it thus best placed to organise the initial 
consultations. It must guide the debate with a view to the ‘Community 
interest’ of the EU, which can neither be defined by the Council (focusing 
on national interests) nor by the EP (dominated by party-political 
                                                      
7 Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality 
(http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri= 
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preferences). At the same time the Commission must also ensure that the 
essentials of its proposal are acceptable to all relevant actors, so that 
amendments from the Council and the EP can build on the Commission’s 
proposal.  
An automatic external control mechanism for Commission proposals 
that would go beyond the provisions foreseen in the protocol on 
subsidiarity and proportionality would raise many questions about the 
institutional framework of the EU. If every proposal first had to undergo an 
external quality check, it would de facto put an end to the Commission’s 
right of initiative and undermine the delicate balance of powers among EU 
institutions. Quality control should therefore remain with the 
Commission’s Secretariat General and the College of Commissioners as 
politically responsible institutions.  
Some element of external control and pressure could however be 
envisaged through a ‘watch-dog’ function of the European Parliament. If a 
majority of MEPs in the lead committee dealing with the respective 
legislative proposal are of the opinion that the Commission has not been 
sufficiently clear on the objectives of that proposal or that it leaves 
important elements to implementing measures, they could establish a 
mechanism according to which the EP would notify the Commission 
President in an open letter and call upon the Commission to assume its 
political responsibilities. 
An additional problem can be the linguistic and legal quality of the 
proposal’s text. Legislative proposals are normally not written by specialist 
drafters and the Commission’s legal service often only comes in at a later 
stage to review the text. In many cases non-native speakers are drafting the 
proposals in English or French, so that an additional linguistic challenge 
exists. With 23 official languages, it is therefore very important that the 
original language version of a proposal is of great linguistic and legal 
clarity, so that the subsequent translations do not end in ‘Chinese 
whispers’.8 To guarantee high drafting quality in all cases, it should 
therefore be considered to make it a standard that both a legal expert and a 
mother-tongue speaker are involved by the lead DG further ‘upstream’ in the 
drafting process. The same considerations should also apply for the other 
institutions later in the legislative process. 
                                                      
8 This problem has also been acknowledged by the Commission before the House 
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1.2.2  Strengthening the College of Commissioners 
Despite predictions of institutional dead-lock following the 2004 
enlargement, recent research shows that the number of legislative 
proposals adopted by the Commission has not significantly decreased since 
2004, and consultative documents like Green Papers and Communications 
have even become more numerous.9 This result can partly be explained by 
the fact that the Commission has streamlined and centralised its internal 
functioning. Besides ensuring continuity in the overall output, however, 
the Commission has been hesitant to deal with controversial matters over 
the last few years. Whether this is due to the difficult political context that 
followed the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty and the Treaty of Lisbon, 
or whether it reflects a real change of the Commission’s self-understanding 
remains to be seen. 
It is clear, however, that enlargement has strengthened the role of the 
Commission President within the College. Important issues are 
increasingly dealt with by the Commission President and the 
Commissioner(s) directly concerned on a bi-lateral basis rather than 
through discussions within the College. The principle of collegiality – once 
the driving logic of the College – has thus been considerably weakened. 
The current College also does not proceed to take an issue to a vote 
anymore. While the Prodi Commission still voted on about 15 occasions, 
the current one has not done so once. Recent research suggests that this is 
not the result of a deliberate choice, but rather of political incapacity due to 
the greater number of Commissioners (from a greater number of national 
backgrounds) and an attitude of increased cautiousness on the part of 
member states towards the Commission.10 Especially larger states see their 
influence diminished in a body that formerly hosted two of their nationals 
out of a total of 20, and that now hosts only one out of 27. The credible 
prospect of a vote (the so-called ‘shadow of the vote’) increases the chances 
for the adoption of ambitious, but internally controversial legislative 
initiatives. Under the current practice, however, every Commissioner 
enjoys a de facto veto. This makes Commissioners who dissent from the 
                                                      
9 Sebastian Kurpas, Caroline Grøn and Piotr Maciej Kaczyński (2008), The European 
Commission after Enlargement: Does more add up to less?, CEPS Special Report, 
February (http://shop.ceps.eu/BookDetail.php?item_id=1620). 
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majority position less likely to agree to the essential elements of a proposal 
in order to obtain some concessions for their position.  
Box 1.2 Limits of the current College 
The limits of the current College could be observed during the adoption of 
the proposed regulation on the reduction of CO2-emissions from cars 
(COM(2007) 856), which was one of the few internally controversial 
proposals adopted by this Commission. Although it was not even subject to 
a formal vote, four Commissioners (including the ones from Germany and 
France) leaked to the press that they did not stand behind the proposal 
adopted by the College on 19 December 2007. Since then the process has 
been dominated by an agreement between Angela Merkel and Nicolas 
Sarkozy in the Council and by the demands of the EP’s Environment 
Committee, while the Commission hardly featured in the debate. Similar 
observations could be made concerning the directive on services and the 
REACH regulation. In both cases a deal was struck between the Council and 
the European Parliament, with the Commission hardly defending its initial 
proposal. 
A reduction of the number of Commissioners would not only 
increase the capacity of the College to adopt controversial decisions; in 
addition, it would also underline the body’s obligation to serve the 
Community interest and the fact that Commissioners are not 
representatives of their respective country. However, after the Irish no-
vote, it looks increasingly likely that the European Council will agree to 
keep one Commissioner per country in the College, thus abandoning the 
envisaged reduction to 2/3 of the number of member states by 2014. This is 
possible without changing the Treaty of Lisbon, as the text already includes 
such an option in its Art. 9 D (5), if the European Council so decides 
unanimously. If the Treaty of Lisbon does not enter into force, the Protocol 
on Enlargement that was introduced with the Treaty of Nice, foresees that 
once the EU will have 27 member states, the following Commission [i.e. the 
one taking office in the autumn of 2009] will have to have fewer members 
than the EU has member states. Even in this case, however, a possible 
solution could be that only the country from which the High 
Representative for the CFSP comes will not have a Commissioner anymore, 
thus leaving the membership of the College at 26. 12 | THE FUTURE OF EU DECISION-MAKING 
1.2.2.1  Recommendations 
The current debate about each country ‘keeping its Commissioner’ carries 
the risk of an ‘inter-governmentalisation’ of the College, with national 
governments rather putting forward candidates for Commissioners whose 
key qualification is loyalty to the national leadership. An incentive for 
sending strong personalities to the College would be the creation of 
interesting horizontal portfolios for Commissioners, e.g. a Commissioner 
for ‘Competitiveness’, for ‘Climate Change’ or for ‘Quality of Legislation’. 
This would also provide the Commission with a face on these high-level 
issues, which would help to give it more visibility in the media. 
Additionally it would put the available resources in one hand. The concept 
is inspired by the business sector where resources are often allocated 
flexibly to specific project leaders for a given time. It would have to be 
adapted to the public service, however, as earlier attempts to establish 
horizontal structures within the Commission have often failed in practice. 
Considerable internal resistance to a more flexible allocation of staff and 
resources can thus be expected. There would have to be guarantees that re-
allocation of staff would only be temporary and subject to review. 
Measures should be introduced with a pilot project of limited scope, and 
upon an evaluation of results, it could then be extended to other areas. An 
additional problem results again from the size of the College, as it is 
already difficult to identify meaningful portfolios for 27 Commissioners 
under the current conditions. 
The current size of the College should be reduced. If this proves to be 
impossible, however, the Commission should consider other ways of 
ensuring its capacity to agree on internally controversial proposals. One 
option would be to reinforce the coordinating structures within the 
Commission, with horizontal issues coming under the direct supervision of 
the Commission President. Another option would be a system of rotation 
concerning the voting right of Commissioners instead of the number of 
College members. Such a step would however require treaty change (i.e. 
changing Art. 219 TEC). A third possibility would be the creation of five or 
six thematic ‘clusters’ of Commissioners, with each of these clusters coming 
under the responsibility of a Vice-President. This would combine the 
advantages of each nationality keeping a high-level interlocutor with a 
more workable size of the College. It would not necessitate Treaty change 
and could go as far as giving the respective Vice-President the ultimate say 
on whether a proposal will be presented to the College. As the Vice-
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de-facto an ‘inner circle’ could be established. In order to avoid a 
‘directoire’ of large member states, however, clear guidelines would have 
to be established beforehand. These provisions should be presented as the 
logical and political counter-balance to the likely future composition of the 
Commission (i.e. ‘one Commissioner per member state’). It should be made 
clear that the Commission should not become a ‘secretariat’ of member 
states, but has to preserve the capacity to define and defend the 
‘Community interest.’  
If hierarchical and functional differentiation in the rules of procedure 
is not an option, however, much will depend on institutional practice and 
political leadership in the Commission. With weaker collegiality and a 
stronger position of the Commission President within the College, it is 
crucial that a planned initiative enjoys the full backing of the president. 
Once the president has given the political backing, Commissioners have to 
rely on him/her to defend the essential elements of the proposal, even in 
case of strong opposition from member states or the EP. 
1.3  Council of Ministers and European Council: Ensuring coherence 
and continuity 
Just like the Commission, the Council of Ministers has not experienced 
paralysis after 2004, but the Council is the institution most affected by the 
‘effect of numbers’ following enlargement and the shift from 15 to 27 
national delegations has meant a major change for intergovernmental 
negotiations. Hagemann & De Clerck-Sachsse (2007) concluded that the 
overall legislative output of the Council has remained stable while 
difficulties in reaching agreement can particularly be observed in areas 
where unanimity prevails (e.g. Justice and Home Affairs, General Affairs).11 
According to interviews conducted in the framework of their research, 
“negotiators experience agreements being reached on the basis of a lower 
common denominator, since the content of individual proposals must now 
accommodate a more diverse set of interests”.12 This indication falls in line 
with Settembri’s finding that legislative acts have on average become 
longer by 15%, thus signalling a need to accommodate a greater number of 
                                                      
11 Sara Hagemann and Julia De Clerck-Sachsse (2007), Old Rules, New Game: 
Decision-Making in the Council of Ministers after the 2004 Enlargement, CEPS Special 
Report, March, p. 35. 
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national reservations.13 Settembri (2007) also finds that the share of what he 
qualifies as “important acts” has decreased by roughly one-third, while the 
share of “marginal acts” has significantly increased in the EU-25 (57.1%) as 
compared to the EU-15 (42.6%).14 
Against this background, the two key challenges for the Council 
remain ensuring coherence and continuity of its work: coherence is crucial 
as the Council meets in nine different policy formations, and political and 
administrative continuity is needed due to the fact that the Council 
presidency rotates on a 6-monthly basis. In the following section, proposals 
are presented that address these key challenges by increasing the capacity 
of the Council to deal with the ‘effect of numbers’. 
1.3.1  Streamlining negotiations 
Since enlargement proceedings have become lengthier and more 
formalised within the official bodies of the Council, this has prompted a 
shift towards informal practices and ‘pre-cooking’ of decisions among key 
delegations.15 The pressure on the Presidency and all coordinating bodies 
                                                      
13 Pierpaolo Settembri (2007), The surgery succeeded. Has the patient died? The impact 
of enlargement on the European Union, Jean Monnet Working Paper 04/07, pp. 27/28 
(http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/07/070401.pdf). 
14 Ibid. According to Settembri, “important acts” are legislative acts that score 
positively on at least four of the following points, while “marginal acts” score 
positively on at most one (all others are categorised as “ordinary acts”): 
-  Bill introduced by ‘oral procedure in the Commission 
-  Bill discussed in the Council at least once as a B point 
-  Opinion adopted on bill by any other committee in the EP besides the 
responsible one 
-  Bill based on a treaty article (as opposed to secondary legislation) 
-  Bill is ‘new’ legislation (i.e. not amending, implementing or otherwise 
interfering with existing legislation). 
15 Hagemann & De Clerck-Sachsse, ibid., p. 12; Helen Wallace (2007), Adapting to 
Enlargement of the European Union: Institutional Practice since May 2004, Trans 
European Policy Studies Association (TEPSA), November, p. 13 
(http://www.tepsa.be/docs/TEPSA%20-%20Wallace%20Publication%20 
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has significantly increased. Certain measures have already been taken, but 
their proper enforcement often depends on the respective Presidency.16  
1.3.1.1  Recommendations 
Significant streamlining of the procedure could be achieved with relatively 
modest means. Especially concerning the Presidency and the Council 
Secretariat progress can be made by changing certain practices and 
expanding the use of innovative instruments. They would give negotiations 
more structure and result in a much more efficient use of time. The two 
examples presented below – issue papers and negotiating boxes – have 
already been used successfully during the very contentious and politically 
sensitive negotiations on the last budgetary perspective and on the 
agreement of annual fishing quotas. Their application should therefore be 
extended to a broader range of issues. 
Box 1.3 Good practices: Issue papers and negotiating boxes 
Issue papers can be used by the Presidency to identify and present all 
contentious aspects at the beginning of negotiations. Compared to a ‘tour de 
table’ followed by a simple (verbatim) report reflecting the different national 
statements, an ‘issue paper’ could save a lot of time by focusing directly on 
the problematic points. Such a paper could either be based on an initial 
discussion or on written contributions from all delegations indicating to the 
Presidency which aspects are seen as problematic. Once the negotiations 
have started, a ‘negotiating box’ could be used as standard procedure to give 
discussions focus and structure. In this document the presidency lists all 
contentious points, suggested solutions plus the respective state of play. The 
document is subject to constant revision tracking the progress of the 
                                                      
16 For example, delegations are encouraged not to insist on a ‘tour de table’ at the 
beginning of each session. On most subjects there are groups of countries holding 
the same position, so that 27 statements are often repetitive. If however, for 
whatever reason, a delegation insists on its own statement, others will follow suit 
and meetings become lengthy and unattractive. Especially at the highest level this 
development has already lead to a trend of ministers rather sending their deputies, 
state secretaries or high officials instead of participating themselves in Council 
meetings. During the Dutch EU Presidency, a good practice had been introduced 
according to which national delegations presented written contributions also on 
behalf of other delegations holding similar positions. Unfortunately, this practice 
has been abandoned by the subsequent presidencies. 16 | THE FUTURE OF EU DECISION-MAKING 
negotiations. It would also indicate where contentious points can potentially 
be linked to achieve an overall agreement. The negotiating box functions as 
an ‘institutional memory’ when one Presidency takes over from another, as 
debates would simply continue according to the stage indicated in the 
document. In 2005 this was done with the handover from the Luxembourg 
to the UK Presidency on the budgetary perspective negotiations and helped 
to keep the difficult negotiations on track. 
The increased use of issue papers and negotiating boxes would give a 
lot of responsibility to the Presidency and the General Secretariat (see Box 
1.3). in particular, the Presidency would have to take its task as an honest 
broker very seriously, as delegations would certainly not accept if issues 
that are important to them were ignored or side-lined in the document. It 
may involve special training for those officials from the Presidency or the 
Secretariat General that would be involved in drafting issue papers and 
updating negotiation boxes, as the acceptance of this approach will 
certainly depend on their political sensitivity and drafting skills. As regards 
the use of languages, it would be the easiest solution, if these internal 
documents were to be drafted in only one language. Since this would most 
probably be English, objections from France and Germany can however be 
expected. 
Another proposal that would simplify negotiations is the increased 
use of sub-groups of delegations to clarify contentious issues before 
decisions are taken in the plenary. These groups could have different 
functions ranging from the simple exploration of an issue to pre-
negotiations. Membership in groups could either depend on the stakes 
involved for the respective country or there could be one representative for 
each group of countries holding similar positions. The sub-groups would 
not take any decisions and they would be guided and supervised by the 
Presidency, the Council’s Secretariat General and the Commission. 
However, the acceptance of this approach will largely depend on the level 
of trust between member states and the skills of the Presidency to maintain 
this trust. The first case(s) will therefore be crucial for a more general 
acceptance of this approach, as so far all delegations have insisted in being 
part of all official meetings. Meetings in smaller formations have always 
been unofficial, which gives a structural advantage to large member states. 
As their weight counts particularly during the official negotiations, large 
member states are much more likely to be consulted also during the 
unofficial phase. Smaller member states must be particularly pro-active and 
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The increased use of official preparatory sub-groups would help to make 
the current practice more transparent and would help to stress the benefit 
of the argument rather than the political power of its proponent. 
Negotiations could also be streamlined if the number of official 
meetings were to be reduced. Official meetings should only take place if the 
legislative agenda justifies them and not because the Presidency would like 
to hold them for political or prestige reasons. The important function of 
meetings for political ownership of the national level and for the creation of 
mutual trust could often be better achieved with an unofficial meeting 
instead. In contrast to an official meeting with an unappealing formal 
agenda in Brussels, these meetings could take place in the country of the 
Presidency and focus on a topical issue in the respective policy area. This 
approach could even be considered for the European Council, where two 
out of the four meetings per year could be informal summits. Although an 
atmosphere of ‘fire-side talks’ are a rather unlikely perspective with 27 
participants, the agenda would be more open for general and topical 
discussions and it would allow for more informal exchanges among 
leaders. 
Finally, it should be considered how the Presidency conclusions of 
European summits could become more focused and apt to the role of the 
European Council as a provider of political orientation for the EU-27. At 
present the text is often unduly long and contains many general statements 
that dilute the key messages. One option would be to limit the length of the 
text to a maximum of 10 pages. Another possibility would be to split the 
text in a limited main part and a second more general part. Since the 
Presidency conclusions are largely pre-negotiated since the 2002 ‘Seville 
reforms’, an obligatory limit to the length of the text would greatly help to 
‘discipline’ national representatives involved in the drafting process by 
making them focus on a number of main issues. 
All of the proposals that have been made under this point could be 
introduced without any treaty changes and would make an important 
contribution to a much-needed streamlining of Council negotiations. Much 
will depend on the Presidency to set successful precedents, so that member 
states’ delegations will have the necessary trust to agree to more 
streamlined and structured standard procedures. 
1.3.2  Improving coordination structures 
Due to its organisational structure, the Council is particularly dependent on 
effective coordination mechanisms. The fact that the Council meets in 9 18 | THE FUTURE OF EU DECISION-MAKING 
different formations inevitably means a risk of incoherence. As such, 
Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace state: “The pronounced segmentation of work 
between policy areas and between Councils (and the working parties and 
committees that prepare ministerial meetings) impedes coherent decision-
making and the consistent treatment of subjects.”17 Particularly in countries 
with coalition governments and relatively weak coordination mechanisms, 
national positions are not always fully consistent across Council 
formations. As such it can happen that a member state takes a different 
position in one Council formation (e.g. the Environment Council) than in 
another one (e.g. the Competitiveness Council). This can lead to confusion 
among other delegations and to procedural delays.  
Another challenge is the rotation of the Council Presidency. It leads 
to discontinuity, as Presidency staff and political priorities change every six 
months. The disadvantages of the rotating presidency have been addressed 
with increased cooperation between subsequent presidencies.18 These 
efforts have certainly helped to reduce inconsistencies and discontinuity, 
but they cannot completely avoid that each presidency still pushes its 
special issues and that the responsible staff changes every six months. 
If the Treaty of Lisbon enters into force, the number of Council 
formations will remain almost the same and the rotation scheme will be 
maintained for all Council formations except for Foreign Affairs (to be 
chaired by the new ‘double hat’ High Representative) as well as for the 
European Council (with a permanent chair for 2 ½ years). This means that 
the current problems are likely to persist also in the future. At this point it 
remains unclear what the impact of a General Affairs Council (GAC), 
separated from the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) will be. In a ‘worst case 
scenario’ it will give rise to a structural conflict about competences between 
the two Council formations, for example on preparations for the Heads of 
States’ meetings with their counterparts from Russia, the US or China. In 
                                                      
17 Fiona Hayes-Renshaw and Helen Wallace (2006), The Council of Ministers, 
Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2nd edition, p. 337; see also Christian Egenhofer 
et al. (2006), Policy Coherence on Development in the EU Council – Strategies for the Way 
Forward, CEPS Special Report, Brussels 
(http://shop.ceps.eu/downfree.php?item_id=1356). 
18 Since 2007, a system of ‘team presidencies’ has been introduced. Under this 
system groups of three subsequent presidencies prepare a common programme 
covering 18 months. POLICY-MAKING IN THE EU | 19 
that case the new provisions could lead to a less coherent picture of the EU 
towards outside partners and would create a need for very clear rules of 
procedure. In a positive scenario the separate GAC will become a strong 
horizontal structure that helps to coordinate national positions in the other 
Council formations. 
1.3.2.1  Recommendations 
Coherent and continuous decision-making in the Council depends on good 
coordination both within the Council as well as in national capitals. Both at 
the EU-level and in member states stronger coordinating structures should 
be envisaged. The perspective of the re-introduction of a separate General 
Affairs Council (GAC) under the Treat y  o f  L i s b o n  m a y  b e  u s e d  a s  a n  
additional opportunity to promote such structures. 
At the European level, the GAC should determine the role of other 
Council formations concerning important pieces of legislation or legislative 
packages that touch upon several policy areas without clear emphasis. 
‘Jumbo Councils’ (i.e. joint meetings of different formations) should be 
avoided in the future, as their sheer size makes them difficult to handle. 
Instead, the use of ‘ad hoc working parties’ should be extended. This means 
that the number of participants per delegation is strictly limited, but it 
remains up to the national level to decide who participates and speaks as a 
representative of the respective member state.19  
At the national level, a genuine coordinator of EU policy who enjoys 
the necessary political backing of the Head of State or Government20 should 
be introduced in all member states. Ideally, this person would carry the 
title of ‘Minister for European Affairs’. In some countries such a position 
already exists, while in others past attempts have failed (particularly in 
those with coalition governments and a strong coordinating role within the 
Foreign Ministry and/or other Ministries). Considerable resistance can 
therefore also be expected in the future, but it cannot be ignored that 
member states with a strong coordinating position perform most efficiently 
                                                      
19 In case of the REACH regulation on chemicals this approach was successfully 
applied. As delegations had to be small, member states were forced to organise 
horizontally across ministries and could not extrapolate their internal coordination 
problems and inter-ministerial rivalries to the European level. 
20 This would normally be the Prime Minister or Chancellor. In case of France, it 
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at the EU level. The perspective of a separate GAC under the Treaty of 
Lisbon could be an incentive to revive this idea, but even if the treaty may 
not come into force, member states should be encouraged to introduce such 
a position. 
1.4  The European Parliament: Managing diversity and increasing 
legitimacy 
Of all EU institutions, it is the European Parliament that has gained most 
new competences and powers with each of the treaty reforms over the past 
three decades. Since its members have been directly elected for the first 
time in 1979, the EP has developed from a mostly consultative body to a 
serious co-legislator in most policy fields of the first pillar. The Treaty of 
Lisbon would be another step in this direction, bringing important parts of 
agricultural policy and the current third pillar (judicial cooperation on 
criminal matters and police cooperation) under the co-decision procedure 
(or ‘ordinary legislative procedure’ as it would be called then).  
Its gain in legislative and political powers does not mean, however, 
that the EP is not facing important challenges that impact on the EU 
decision-making process. This has also been recognised by the EP itself and 
since February 2007 an EP-internal ‘Working Party on Parliamentary 
Reform’ (WPPR) has been set up by the Conference of Presidents. It is 
chaired by the German MEP Dagmar Roth-Behrendt and has the mandate 
to consider changes to all aspects of parliamentary procedures.21 
Compared to the WPPR, which focuses in great detail on internal 
rules and procedures of the EP, the present study takes a larger view. It 
d o e s  h o w e v e r  b u i l d  o n  s o m e  o f  t h e  f i n d i n g s  a n d  t a k e s  i n t o  a c c o u n t  
important recommendations of the reports. Two key challenges are 
discussed here: managing diversity and increasing legitimacy. 
                                                      
21 So far the WPPR presented two interim reports: The Plenary and the Calendar of 
Activities (September 2007). The great majority of reform proposals in this report 
has been endorsed by the Conference of Presidents of the EP; and Legislative 
Activities and Interinstitutional Relations (May 2008). The report was still under 
consideration by the Conference of Presidents at the end of 2008, but has received a 
largely positive reaction. A third report on External Relations and proposals as regards 
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1.4.1  Dealing with amendments 
The European Parliament has not only gained in legislative competences 
and political self-confidence since 1979, but also the number of deputies 
and their national diversity has grown. With currently 785 members, the EP 
is the largest directly elected parliament in the world.22 More than 700 
deputies is certainly hardly an ideal size for the internal functioning of a 
parliament. Recent research suggests, however that the EP has coped rather 
well with the increase in members after the 2004 enlargement23 and 
prospects for a reduction below the threshold of 700 are very slim.24 The 
political sensitivity of the number of deputies has been demonstrated 
during the IGC on the Treaty of Lisbon, when the Italian delegation 
successfully threatened to veto an agreement, if the number of Italian MEPs 
were not to be increased to equal the number granted to the UK (i.e. 73).25 
Due to the high number of MEPs, most of the actual work on 
legislative content is done at committee level.26 Committees are crucial 
instruments to structure the internal process of the EP, but there are still 
aspects that make this process quite unwieldy and difficult to follow. One 
of the most problematic ones for stakeholders following the legislative 
process is the enormous number of – sometimes even contradictory – 
                                                      
22 From an initial 410 MEPs from 9 member states, the number quickly rose to 434 
(1981: Accession of Greece), 518 (1986: Accession of Portugal and Spain), 626 (1995: 
Accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden), 732 (2004: Accession of ten new 
member states) and finally 785 (2007: Accession of Bulgaria and Romania). See 
http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/NumberOfSeats.asp?LANG=ENG& 
REGION_SUB_REGION=All&typesearch=1&Submit1=Launch+query. 
23 Wallace (2007), ibid., p. 15; Olivier Costa, “Parlement Européen et Elargissement 
– Entre Fantasme et Réalité”, in Renaud Dehousse, Florence Deloche-Gaudez and 
Olivier Duhamel (eds), Comment l’Europe s’adapte, Science Po Presse, Paris, pp. 75-
96. 
24 After the 2009 elections the number of deputies will be reduced to 736 according 
to the Treaty of Nice, but it would increase again temporarily with the likely 
accession of Croatia during the next legislative period. If the Treaty of Lisbon 
enters into force, the number of MEPs will be 750 (plus the president of the EP) 
from 2014 onwards. 
25 Renata Goldirova, “EU agrees new ‘Lisbon Treaty’”, euobserver, 19 October 2007 
(http://euobserver.com/9/25001). 
26 Richard Corbett, Francis Jacobs and Michael Shackleton (2007), The European 
Parliament, 7th edition, London: John Harper Publishing, p. 9. 22 | THE FUTURE OF EU DECISION-MAKING 
amendments tabled on important dossiers. At committee level there is no 
limitation as to who can present amendments. Any MEP, if member of the 
committee or not, can put them forward. Plenary amendments however are 
only voted if they are tabled by either one of the political groups, the 
committee responsible for the report or at least 40 MEPs (i.e. about 5% of 
MEPs). 
Despite the acknowledgement of the problem, early considerations 
on limiting the number of amendments have however not been included in 
the first report of the WPPR. With a total of 10,767 plenary amendments 
issued in 2006 alone, concerns had been voiced that the great number 
would make the debate too technical and difficult to follow, but most 
members of the WPPR saw a limitation of amendments as going against the 
very rationale of the EP as a deliberative body.27 It is indeed difficult to 
determine at which stage such a cap on amendments should be made and it 
is likely that MEPs with extreme views would have used a limitation to 
present themselves as victims of ‘anti-democratic’ EP rules of procedure. 
1.4.1.1  Recommendations 
According to the EP’s rules of procedure the President can request the 
committee responsible to act as a ‘filter’ and consider plenary amendments, 
if more than 50 non-committee amendments have been tabled. Any 
amendment that does not receive favourable votes from at least 1/10 of the 
committee members will not be put to the vote in plenary (Rule 156).28 The 
WPPR had recommended making it obligatory for the committee 
responsible to consider amendments, if they exceed a certain number,29 but 
the Conference of Presidents did not follow this recommendation. 
However, such change to the rules of procedures is worth reconsidering, as 
it would help to focus the debate and avoid repetitions and inconsistencies 
                                                      
27 Lucia Kubusova, “MEPs want to see fewer Heads of State in Plenary”, euobserver, 
20 September 2007 (http://euobserver.com/9/24801). 
28 Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament, 16th edition, February 2008 
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+ 
RULES-EP+20080218+RULE-156+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN& 
navigationBar=YES). 
29 European Parliament (2007), Working Party on Parliamentary Reform, First 
Interim Report on “The Plenary and the Calendar of Activities”, PE 392.600/CPG/GT 
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of the EP position at an early stage. It is also likely to have a beneficial effect 
on the overall quality of the legislative text.  
Beyond this, a code of conduct could be considered that would 
outline criteria for tabling amendments (e.g. avoiding repetitions or 
contradictions). The enforcement of these criteria can however only be of a 
political, non-administrative nature. It would have to be the responsibility 
of political group leaders, committee chairpersons, ‘rapporteurs’ or other 
p o l i t i c a l  a c t o r s  t o  e x e r c i s e  p r e s s u r e  o n  o t h e r  M E P s  t o  m a k e  t h e m  a c t  
responsibly. As possibilities for party discipline remain however weaker in 
the EP compared to national parliaments, it is difficult to predict the actual 
impact of such a code of conduct. 
1.4.2  Increasing visibility and public debate 
The increased legislative role and political self-confidence of the EP remain 
in a strong contrast to the limited importance that citizens and national 
media give to this institution. This is illustrated both by the low turnout in 
European Parliament elections as well as in the lack of public debate on the 
EP’s legislative activities.30  
The Treaty of Lisbon would have introduced an official vote of the 
newly elected EP on the Commission President, but it is clear by now that 
the text will not be in force in time for the elections. The link between the 
outcome of the elections and the establishment of the new Commission will 
thus not become more visible. Other limitations that make EP elections 
unattractive for the national voter will also remain:  
•  Most probably there will not be two (or more) competing candidates 
running for Commission President ahead of the 2009 elections, as 
only the EPP may name Barroso as its candidate. 
•  The political programmes of the European parties are likely to remain 
very general, bridging the gap between many national member 
parties. As the election is not clearly linked to a European executive 
and the EP itself does not have a right of legislative initiative, it is 
                                                      
30 Since its first direct elections in 1979, voter turnout has constantly decreased. In 
2004 turnout reached an all-time low of 45.5%, with participation around 20% in 
some of the new member states. The prospects do not look promising for the 2009 
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difficult for European Parties to present concrete policy proposals 
before the elections. 
•  Members of the European Parliament will again be exclusively 
elected on the basis of national or regional lists or according to 
electoral constituencies controlled by national or regional parties. 
This gives a major incentive for MEPs to ensure support from their 
respective national party establishment rather than relying on their 
own performance at the EU-level. 
European elections are thus most likely to remain what they have 
been in the past: A ‘second order national contest’31 that is used by national 
parties as an opportunity to test the grounds for the next national elections. 
Voters will make their choice mostly according to their views on national 
politics and even those who decide according to EU matters, will mostly do 
so according to whether they like or do not like ‘Europe,’ rather than 
according to political preferences on concrete EU policy issues.  
The EP’s failure to create public debate is not only confined to the 
European elections, but is also reflected by the lack of public interest for the 
legislative activity of the EP in general. Fraud allegations and the 
controversy over abandoning the EP’s Strasbourg seat usually draw 
considerably more attention from national media than any of the EP’s – 
sometimes far-reaching – legislative decisions under the co-decision 
procedure. 
The concern about a lack of visibility and public debate has also been 
stressed by the WPPR.32 The WPPR makes a link between ‘technocratic 
                                                      
31 Karlheinz Reif and Hermann Schmitt, “Nine Second-Order National Elections: A 
Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of European Election Results”, European 
Journal of Political Research, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1980, pp. 3-45; Cees van der Eijk and Mark 
Franklin (eds), Choosing Europe? The European Electorate and National Politics in the 
Face of Union, Ann Arbor, 1996, University of Michigan Press. 
32 In one of its working documents the group regrets that current practices would 
“certainly not increase Parliament's visibility in the public and the media, who are 
looking for political confrontation along clear political lines and not for a flat, 
'technocratic' debate where the representatives of the three Institutions 
congratulate each other on the "good work" done.” European Parliament (2007), 
Working Party on Parliamentary Reform, Codecision and Conciliation, Working 
Document No. 12 (Part II), 11 December 2007, p. 2 (http://www.poptel.co.uk/ 
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debates’ and a significant increase in ‘quick deal’ agreements during first 
readings.33 The trend is especially strong in those policy areas where the EP 
has gained powers only recently, for example in Justice and Home Affairs. 
The extension of the co-decision procedure to new policy areas under the 
Treaty of Lisbon (e.g. agriculture, fisheries, external trade, police 
cooperation) may thus further reinforce the trend. MEPs are likely to come 
under pressure from Council and Commission not to ‘block’ legislation in 
the new areas and the capacity of EP support structures that help making a 
critical assessment of a proposal will become more squeezed. 
A major incentive for decision-makers to come to an agreement 
during first reading is the fact that a simple majority is sufficient, while an 
absolute majority (i.e. at least 393 MEPs) is needed during the second 
reading. First and ‘early second reading’ agreements are not necessarily 
problematic for the quality of legislation, as second readings rarely lead to 
a significant change of the legislative text. However, first readings tend to 
be more informal, which makes the process rather less transparent and 
limits the possibilities for having controversial debates. The WPPR 
expressed its concern about this lack of debate backfiring when the act is 
actually implemented. At this stage the act is then often presented at the 
national level as an ‘illegitimate act’ of a detached ‘Brussels bureaucracy’.  
A number of proposals from the WPPR to improve the situation have 
already been adopted in October 2007.34 They particularly concern plenary 
sessions, aiming to increase the quality of debate and making them more 
attractive for the media. This includes, for example: 
•  clear sections of the plenary agenda with ‘priority debates’ on major 
legislation taking place on Tuesdays and topical political issues on 
Wednesdays; 
•  a ‘cooling off’ period of at least one month between votes in the 
committee and votes in the plenary, which should allow MEPs to 
                                                      
33 During the current legislature (i.e. since November 2004) first reading 
agreements account for 64% of all co-decision agreements, compared to only 28% 
during the last one (1999-2004). If early second reading agreements (i.e. EP 
amendments being directly integrated into the Council’s common position 
following informal negotiations) are also counted, 80% of all agreements are 
covered. Ibid, p. 2/3. 
34 See http://www.europarl.europa.eu/multimedia/eplive/cont/ 
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better consider their final positions at first readings and give more 
time to ensure the quality of legislative texts; 
•  debates directly before the respective vote, with political group 
speakers speaking systematically at the beginning of the debate; 
•  additional speaking time for rapporteurs, who will also have the last 
word in order to react to interventions; 
•  five minute ‘catch-the-eye’ sessions in every debate to give the word 
to MEPs who are not on the pre-arranged speaking list.  
Beyond this, the WPPR proposes the adoption of a Code of Conduct for 
Negotiating Co-decision Files, which should be put in annex to the EP’s rules 
of procedure. So far guidelines that were agreed in November 2004 have 
not been followed by all committees, while a ‘Code of Conduct’ attached to 
the rules of procedure would have greater visibility for those MEPs and 
staff who need to apply them. The Code of Conduct should enhance 
transparency, for example through a clear mandate for any team that 
negotiates on behalf of the EP. It should also make it obligatory for 
negotiation teams to send reports on the outcome of talks to the respective 
committee, including making available all distributed texts. 
1.4.2.1  Recommendations 
As argued above, there is a considerable risk that the upcoming European 
elections will again be dominated by national politics during the election 
campaign, produce a low turnout and see an increase in votes for 
eurosceptic and populist parties. A low turnout would undermine the 
legitimacy of the EP and stronger eurosceptic parties would increase the 
risk of institutional dead-lock during the next legislature (e.g. through an 
increase in amendments that are simply aiming at disturbing the legislative 
process). If it materialises, the outcome of the European elections must 
therefore be used to create a momentum for elaborating concrete proposals 
aiming at a more democratic, transparent and inclusive European decision-
making process by the incoming EU presidency. For example, these 
proposals could envisage finding ways how the presidency can help 
promoting the current internal EP reforms. Also, the implementation of 
some of the WPPR’s proposals on giving more visibility the co-decision 
procedure would very much benefit from the Presidency’s support, for 
example: 
•  “Ensure better presence of Council and Commission representatives at 
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•  Re-evaluate the current system of order of interventions in the EP plenary 
by the Commission and the Council with at view to making debate more 
lively and more focused on the parliamentary aspect of the debate […] 
•  Open up Conciliation Committee meetings to the public (possibly through 
web streaming) […]”35 
As the scope of the WPPR’s work is by definition limited to a reform 
of the EP’s internal rules, however, proposals could also take a larger 
scope. Greater efforts for transparency and visibility on the side of all 
institutions should be made and more efficient and spontaneous inter-
institutional cooperation should be envisaged in order to make the 
European decision-making process more interesting and understandable 
for a wider public. A recent joint declaration between the EP, Council and 
the Commission on ‘Communicating Europe in Partnership’ should be used as 
a point of departure.36 Problems with the European Commission’s 
myparl.eu-project (intended to establish a virtual network for debate 
between MEPs and national MPs in view of the European elections) 
illustrate how important inter-institutional consultation and coordination 
is.37 It is also of key importance that all ideas are developed in partnership 
with the political actors on the ground. Any attempt – regardless how well-
intended – that is seen as ‘prescription from above’ is likely to be 
counterproductive. 
1.5  National parliaments: Ensuring a stronger involvement in EU-
decision-making 
In most EU member states, the involvement of national parliamentarians in 
EU affairs has been marginal in the past. Established structures like the 
Conference of Community and European Affairs Committees of Parliaments of the 
European Union (COSAC)38 have strengthened the networks among ‘EU 
expert’-MPs (i.e. usually the members from the respective EU Affairs 
Committee) rather than ‘mainstreaming’ EU affairs into the work of 
                                                      
35 European Parliament (2008), Working Party on Parliamentary Reform, Second 
Interim Report on Legislative Activities and Interinstitutional Relations, 21 May 2008, 
pp. 8-9. 
36  Communicating Europe in Partnership, 22 October 2008 (http://ec.europa.eu/ 
commission_barroso/wallstrom/pdf/press_poldec_20081022_en.pdf) 
37 http://www.myparl.eu/myparl/public/landing.jsp 
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specialised committees. However, a number of national parliaments have 
recently reviewed their management of EU-affairs or are in the process of 
doing so.  
In this context, the experience of the Swedish Riksdag should be 
mentioned as an example of positive change. Since January 2007 it has 
forwarded Commission proposals not only to the EU Affairs Committee, 
but also to the respective specialised committee(s). In practice, this means 
that specialised committees are more involved in EU affairs than in the past 
and that they can be involved at a very early stage (normally already when 
the Council Working Groups take up their work). Specialised Committees 
can now ask for a hearing with government ministers and are often in a 
much better position to provide input to the government on the substance 
of the respective matter than the EU Affairs Committee would be. The 
ultimate hearing (i.e. before the vote in the Council of Ministers) still takes 
place in the EU Affairs Committee, but in many cases it just takes up the 
points raised by the specialised committees.  
According to Swedish observers the new system has increased 
ownership of national MPs, which also proves to be beneficial at the 
implementing stage. MPs who are experts on a specific policy issue are 
now better informed about the respective EU activities. Whether the new 
system has also contributed to a wider public debate on EU matters is less 
evident, but certainly MPs cannot tell their electorate any longer that they 
do not know what the EU does in their policy area. Since the new 
arrangements on the involvement of specialised committees have come into 
force in January 2007 the number of committees and individual MPs 
coming to Brussels has already increased considerably. The ‘Swedish 
model’ certainly does not eliminate the problem of EU affairs normally 
featuring low on the national news agenda, but it is a step in the right 
direction.  
1.5.1.1  Recommendation 
Democratic legitimacy and ownership of the EU by national deputies must 
be enhanced through mainstreaming EU-affairs in the work of national 
parliaments.  
As national parliaments will play a more intense role in the years to 
come as regards their contribution to the good functioning of the Union, 
the opportunity to examine and promote positive national experiences 
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This could be achieved by promoting the creation of a Task Force 
composed by representatives of national parliaments to explore and 
analyse how European affairs are dealt with in each national Parliament 
and highlight potential best practices. Along these lines, the EU Presidency 
could envisage the creation of an inter-parliamentary mechanism for the 
identification of ‘good practices’ across the EU. This could take place 
through stronger personal contacts, but also virtual instruments should be 
considered. For example, it should be tested whether instruments like the 
IPEX-website (Interparliamentary Information Exchange)39 can be useful for 
such an exchange of national experiences. 
Such an approach towards a better implication of national 
parliaments would also help to change the current (self-) understanding of 
many MPs as defensive ‘subsidiarity watchdogs’ to a broader and more 
positive role of national parliaments in EU decision-making. 
1.6  Concluding remarks 
This Chapter has discussed the most pressing challenges facing the EU 
decision- making process today and the in the forthcoming future. It has 
put forward a set of specific recommendations targeting the key decision-
making institutions. National Parliaments are also included in the picture, 
as an integral component of the multilevel structure of the European 
Union. The latter aspect and the balance between EU and national 
components of policy-making will be addressed in greater detail in chapter 
3.  
The main suggestions of this chapter are summarised below and 
divided per institution. 
Recommended improvements for the European Commission 
include: 
•  Aiming at a smaller College with broader portfolios; 
•  Finding alternative ways to improve the internal efficiency of the 
College of Commissioners, if a reduction of its size is not politically 
feasible; 
•  Making a better use of preparatory documents to guide the policy 
debate; 
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•  Ensuring high linguistic and legal drafting quality of legislative 
proposals. 
Decision-making in the Council of Ministers would benefit from:  
•  Streamlined discussions and negotiations through the use of ad hoc 
tools such as issue papers, negotiating boxes and sub-groups; 
•  A reduced number of official ‘prestige’ meetings to the benefit of 
unofficial meetings focusing on topical issues; 
•  More focused Presidency conclusions; 
•  An increased coordination of different Council formations. 
Instead, the European Parliament should: 
•  Be more heavily involved in the selection of key initiatives to be 
included in the annual work programme; 
•  Adopt a code of conduct for tabling amendments. 
 
Finally, the creation of a Task Force composed by representatives of 
the 27 national Parliaments to explore and analyse how European affairs 
are dealt with in each national Parliament and possibly identify bets 
practices should be promoted at the highest political level.   
| 31 
 
 
2.  BETTER REGULATION 
ANDREA RENDA 
etter regulation is commonly defined as a broad strategy to improve 
the regulatory environment, containing a range of initiatives to 
consolidate, codify and simplify existing legislation and improve the 
quality of new legislation by evaluating its likely impact.  
Since the late 1980s, better regulation has increasingly been at the 
forefront of the EU agenda, but only with the Commission’s 2001 White 
Paper on European Governance, the Commission has set up a 
comprehensive and consistent agenda for the establishment of better 
regulation standards in the EU.40 A few months after the publication of the 
White Paper on European Governance, the Mandelkern Group on Better 
Regulation published its final report, which specified some of the features 
of the prospective new Impact Assessment (IA) model, suggesting its 
adoption by the Commission before June 2002 and its application to all 
Commission proposals with possible regulatory effects.41 During 2002 and 
early in 2003, the Commission developed its Action Plan on Better 
Regulation through eight targeted Communications, at the same time 
defining with the European Parliament and the Council an overall strategy 
on better law-making. These initiatives, which the potential to significantly 
improve the regulatory environment, especially for European businesses, 
have undergone significant evolution in the past few years (see Box 2.1). 
 
                                                      
40 See European Commission, White Paper on European Governance, 
COM(2001)727, 25 July 2001. 
41 M a n d e l k e r n  G r o u p ,  F i n a l  R e p o r t  ( a v a i l a b l e  a t   http://europa.eu.int/comm/ 
secretariat_general/impact/docs/mandelkern.pdf).  
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Box 2.1 Recent steps in the EU better regulation agenda 
Recent major steps in the Commission’s better regulation agenda include the 
following: the re-launch of the Lisbon agenda under the name “Partnership 
for growth and jobs” that identified better regulation as one of the main 
pillars of competitiveness and sustainable development in Europe 
(COM(2005)24, at §3.2.3); the growing involvement of the European 
Parliament and the Council through the 2003 Inter-Institutional Agreement 
on Better Lawmaking and the 2005 agreement on a ‘common approach’ to 
impact assessment; the appointment in late 2006 of an Impact Assessment 
Board (IAB) in the Commission, responding to repeated calls for better 
quality assurance mechanisms and stronger coordination in the ex ante 
assessment activities carried out by the various DGs; the launch in January 
2007 of the Commission Action Programme for the measurement and 
reduction of administrative burdens generated by EU legislation 
(COM(2007)23 final); the 2007 review of the Commission’s minimum 
standards for external consultation and the oversight role of the IAB in 
checking that these standards have been complied with; the gradual 
strengthening of the Commission’s Simplification Rolling Programme, 
which covers 164 measures for 2005-2009 and is now part of the annual work 
programme. The Commission has already proposed or adopted 91 such 
measures, and envisages the adoption of 44 new measures in 2008. An ex 
post evaluation of the Commission’s IA system was completed in April 2007, 
with overall mixed results and a number of suggestions for improving the 
system in the future. And finally, improved Impact Assessment Guidelines 
were adopted by the Commission in January 2009, together with new 
Annexes containing guidance on risk assessment and a list of best practices. 
The 2009 Communication on the third strategic review of better 
regulation in the European Union confirmed that progress has been 
achieved on several fronts, including cultural change in the Commission, in 
the number and overall quality of IAs performed, in terms of simplification 
and the measurement and reduction of administrative burdens.42 However, 
there are many areas in which the Commission could improve the 
performance and effectiveness of such a wide array of instruments devoted 
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to better regulation, and even more room for improvement can be found in 
other EU institutions and at member state level.43 
In this respect, the Commission clarified its intention to improve the 
quality of impact assessments in the future, by focusing more on legislative 
proposals (also beyond the Legislative and Work Programme); improving 
stakeholder consultation; strengthening the analysis of subsidiarity and 
proportionality; improve the screening of specific impacts; improving the 
quantification of impacts and the assessment of administrative burdens 
where appropriate; and presenting the results in a more transparent way. 
More generally, one of the key messages launched by the Commission over 
the past years is that “[t]he Better Regulation Agenda is already bringing 
concrete benefits for businesses and consumers”, but at the same time “the 
full benefits will only be obtained if all European Institutions and member 
states work together”.44 The main challenge is, in other words, the need to 
involve other EU institutions and member states in the better regulation 
agenda. This can be achieved in several ways, some of which are more 
immediately attainable, whereas others are more difficult to pursue.  
Against this background, the Expert Group on better regulation 
converged around a set of key points to improve the performance of the 
European better regulation agenda. These include an assessment of 
possible refinements in the criteria used for selecting proposals that should 
undergo IA, as well as in applying the principle of proportionate analysis; 
the question of internal/external oversight of the quality of IAs; the 
interaction between IA and the Standard Cost Model (SCM) for measuring 
administrative burdens and the latter’s potential role as a driver of multi-
level convergence; and a possible ‘holistic’ approach to mainstreaming IA 
into the EU policy cycle. Each issue is discussed in detail below.  
                                                      
43 On this point, see also Ragnar E. Löfstedt (2007), “The ‘Plateau-ing’ of the 
European Better Regulation Agenda: An analysis of activities carried out by the 
Barroso Commission”, Journal of Risk Research, 10(4), pp. 427-447; Jonathan Wiener 
(2006), “Better regulation in Europe”, Current Legal Problems, No. 59, pp. 447-518; 
and Radaelli and Meuwese, “Hard questions, and equally hard solutions? 
Proceduralization through impact assessment in the European Union”, paper 
delivered at the CONNEX workshop in Norwich, 28-29 May 2008.  
44 See the Consultation document, available on the Commission’s website at 
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2.1  Expanding the role of the European Commission 
Many of the Expert Group participants pointed at the need for an expanded 
role of the European Commission in performing IA throughout the policy 
cycle. This would entail that the Commission: i) performs IA on its own 
proposals; ii) provides assistance to other EU institutions during the co-
decision procedure, by commenting on the likely economic, social and 
environmental impacts of proposed amendments; and then iii) updates the 
original IA document according to the amendments approved.  
The arguments in favour of such an expanded role include:  
•  The disappointing experience of the ‘Common Approach’ to impact 
assessment: as observed by many participants to the Expert Group, the 
European Parliament and the Council are not undertaking any 
impact assessment on proposed amendments, and the reason seems 
mostly related to political problems, rather than lack of resources. As 
a matter of fact, politicians seem unwilling to rely on evidence for 
decision-making purposes, and the more ‘political’ institutions at EU 
level consequently faced almost insurmountable obstacles in 
launching IAs on major amendments. This, in turn, also means that 
simply endowing these institutions with more resources and 
expertise to perform IA would is unlikely to solve the problem. To 
the contrary, the European Commission has already contemplated 
the possibility to assist other EU institutions in performing IA on the 
amendments they propose.  
•  Having the Commission directly updating its own original IA based on 
proposed amendments would achieve the goal of having all EU institutions 
engaged in evidence-based policy-making, without requiring an active 
participation of the Parliament and Council.  
•  At the same time, the continuous involvement of the Commission 
would also ensure that the IA document does not become obsolete during 
the co-decision procedure, but remains ‘alive’ and represents a key 
reference document that is updated as EU institutions change the text 
of the proposal.  
•  Keeping a ‘live’ IA would also be a very useful interface between EU and 
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point before transposing EU legislation into national law, and 
(possibly) draft their own IAs on implementation measures.45 
•  Centralising IA ‘intelligence’ and competence in the Commission would lead 
to economies of scale and scope. Although the Commission’s 
involvement through to the end of the policy process may appear as 
placing an additional burden on the Commission, the additional 
workload for the Commission is likely to be lower than for any other 
institution, as the Commission DGs in charge of individual IAs 
would just have to update estimates and assessments already carried 
within the IA on the Commission proposal. Furthermore, our 
proposed ‘targeting’ of IA resources on a limited number of strategic 
initiatives would lead to a lower workload for the Commission on 
non-strategic IAs. 
•  Keeping a ‘live’ IA throughout the policy process also means keeping a live’ 
baseline on administrative burdens. Once the Standard Cost Model has 
been applied in the ex ante IA on the Commission’s proposal, there is 
no guarantee that subsequent amendments leave administrative 
burdens unaltered. With a ‘live’ IA, the Commission would be able to 
update its assessment of the impact of the final proposal on 
administrative burdens (including the identification of information 
obligations added and repealed by the proposal, with attached 
quantification of burdens).  
On the other hand, enhancing the Commission’s role in performing IA 
would create the need to stronger accountability and transparency of the 
Commission’s IA work. This issue is addressed in the next sections. 
2.1.1  Strengthening the Commission’s accountability towards 
stakeholders 
As observed above, expanded competence and powers of the Commission 
calls for a stronger oversight on the quality of the Commission IAs. This 
goal can be achieved in several ways, including:  
i)  Strengthening the IAB with more resources and support staff. In 2006 an 
Impact Assessment Board (IAB) was created within the Secretariat 
General, grouping five top-level officials from the SecGen, DG 
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Enterprise, DG Employment, DG Internal Market, DG Environment – 
although the members of the Board act in their personal capacity, not 
representing their own DGs. All Expert Group participants welcomed 
the creation of the IAB, which led to a significant improvement in the 
quality of IAs produced by the Commission. However, given the 
increase in the volume of IAs produced by the Commission, the IAB 
is likely to face resource constraints in the future. More resources and 
staff could thus be needed. 
ii)  Enhancing/institutionalising the role of existing networks such as the HLG 
of national regulatory experts and the HLG of independent stakeholders. For 
example, ex post oversight could be strengthened by mandating that 
existing High Level Groups (HLGs) dealing with IA-related issues 
review a sample of Commission IAs every year and issue suggestions 
for improvement. The groups at hand are the HLG of national 
regulatory experts and the HLG of independent stakeholders (for 
issues concerning the measurement of administrative burdens). This 
option would provide a rather ‘soft’ solution to the need for increased 
accountability of the Commission’s work on IA, providing for an 
‘institutionalisation’ of existing expert groups. This would be 
particularly welcome in case the EU agenda heads towards some 
form of convergence between the IA system and methodology at EU 
and national level, in line with one of the issues identified by the 
Commission in the Communication on the second strategic review of 
better regulation in the EU.46 
iii)  Consultation on draft IAs. Accountability to stakeholders could be 
strengthened if draft IAs were published for consultation before the 
IAB issues an opinion (accept/reject/request amendments). This 
would allow for further input and comments from stakeholders as 
regards the methodology used and the results obtained. In order to 
avoid ‘opening Pandora’s box’, the input sought through the 
consultation on the draft IA would have to be limited to comments on 
the methodology and the data used, so that information missing in 
the IA document is highlighted and provided by external 
stakeholders. The IAB would then rely on more information and data 
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when deciding whether the IA carried out by the Commission was a 
sufficient basis for choosing the preferred policy option. Consulting 
on draft IAs would also, in this respect, avoid that the IA is used only 
as a justification for already selected policy options. To the contrary, 
stakeholder input could help the Commission ‘think outside the box’ 
when identifying and analysing policy options, and use IA as a 
discovery and learning process.  
iv)  Creating a new agency in charge of oversight. The problem of 
strengthening oversight to improve the quality of IAs has long been 
discussed in Brussels. As regards the creation of an external oversight 
body, in charge of quality control, there was very little consensus in 
the Expert Group, also due to a (quite understandable) reluctance 
toward the creation of additional agencies at EU level. A strong 
advocacy (or ‘moral suasion’) role assigned to such an agency would 
require a very thorough revision of the already delicate balance of 
powers existing at EU level, and seems impracticable at this stage. 
Accordingly, it seems fair to state that the ‘outsourcing’ of the quality 
check would not be a feasible solution for boosting the better 
regulation agenda in the EU, at least in the short run.47 
                                                      
47 Over the past months, the Regulatory Reform Committee of the UK House of 
Commons tackled a similar issue for the national better regulation system, where 
the BRE plays a role that can be considered as broadly homologous to that of the 
SecGen/IAB in Brussels. The Committee acknowledged that [t]here is an issue as 
to whether there should be independent review of impact assessments, as 
provided by ACTAL in the case of the Netherlands”, where the Regiegroep 
Regeldruk reportedly stated the usefulness of having a body that provides a “source 
of independent validation of the numbers in impact assessments”. The Committee 
also considered this issue on the basis of a concern expressed by the House of 
Lords Merits Committee – and endorsed by the BCC and by the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) – according to which the 
BRE does not adequately challenge impact assessments performed by Government 
Departments. Accordingly, the Committee concluded that “there is a role for 
independent review of certain, although probably not all, impact assessments”: but 
was “reluctant to recommend the setting up of more Government bodies”. 
However, more recently the UK Government announced that it will set up a new 
external Regulatory Policy Committee whose role will be to advise Government on 
whether they are doing all they can to accurately assess the costs and benefits of 
regulation. As stated by the Government on 2 April 2009, “[t]his body will also 
advise Government on whether regulators are appropriately risk based in their 
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v)  Creating a representation of businesses within the Commission Secretariat 
General, along the lines of the UK Risk and Regulation Advisory 
Council (formerly “Better Regulation Task Force” and “Better 
Regulation Commission”). This option was rejected by Expert Group 
participants. Industry representatives observed that, if draft IAs were 
made available before the final adoption of the proposal, the industry 
would be able to spontaneously create a board in charge of 
scrutinising draft IAs and providing input to the consultation, in 
order to help the IAB take an informed decision on whether to 
accept/reject the draft IA or ask for further revisions. IAs a 
consequence, there would be no need for the Commission to appoint 
yet another High Level Group of experts to act as watchdogs of the 
quality of the Commission’s IAs. 
The debate hosted by the CEPS-CSE Expert Group on better 
regulation led to the identification of preferred options. On the one hand, 
the creation of new agencies and the further empowerment of high level 
groups were rejected as potentially adding more administrative layers to an 
already complex policy process, with important budgetary consequences 
and a negative impact on the efficiency and timeliness of the IA exercise. To 
the contrary, a stronger IAB and consultation on draft IAs were considered 
as highly desirable. Importantly, the possibility of commenting on the draft 
IA was considered as a suitable option for strengthening the Commission’s 
accountability vis-à-vis stakeholders, at a stage of the policy process in 
which the Commission often becomes a ‘black box’, and stakeholders are 
left with little or no chance to see what is being proposed, and why.  
2.1.2  Selecting proposals efficiently 
One of the key features of the EU impact assessment system is the lack of a 
pre-determined threshold for the selection of proposals that should 
undergo IA. While, for example, in the US precise criteria have been 
introduced by the Clinton administration to avoid investing excessively in 
policy appraisal for proposals that exhibit a rather low impact on society,48 
                                                                                                                                       
work; however, it will not have the power to require changes in the behaviour of 
independent regulators”. Other national governments such as Sweden have set up 
a new Regulatory Council, which began its work in September 2008. 
48 See, for a description, A. Renda (2006), Impact Assessment in the EU. The State of 
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at EU level such threshold is still absent. At the same time, while in the US 
the scope of IA is limited to secondary legislation prepared by government 
agencies within their general duty of implementing the government agenda 
set by the presidency, in the EU Impact Assessment has been made 
mandatory for major policy initiatives included in the Commission 
Legislative and Work Programme (CLWP),49 and can encompass both far-
reaching regulatory initiatives, broad strategy documents, White Papers, 
etc. Initiatives that should undergo impact assessment are decided every 
year by the Secretariat General/Impact Assessment Board and the DGs 
concerned. 
The revised IA Guidelines clarify that this “is decided each year by 
the Secretariat General/Impact Assessment Board and the departments 
concerned. In general, impact assessments are necessary for the most 
important Commission initiatives and those which will have the most far-
reaching impacts”.50 The Commission adds that “[t]his will usually be the 
case for any item which is part of the Commission’s Legislative and Work 
Programme (except for initiatives of a consultative or purely reporting 
nature), but it will also be the case for certain catalogue items and 
comitology items.” This statement leaves a degree of uncertainty: in 
particular, it is not clear whether the need for IA depends on the inclusion 
of the initiative in the CLWP, or vice versa. The most reasonable 
interpretation is that the need for IA is independent of the inclusion of an 
initiative in the CLWP: however, it often occurs that initiatives, which are 
included in the CLWP, are also selected for IA. But the opposite may also 
occur. This is decided by the SecGen/IAB.  
This formulation may lead to confusion. In particular, given the 
absence of precise criteria, the accountability of the Commission for having 
included/excluded an initiative from those in need of IA is substantially 
reduced. This could lead to instances in which very important proposals 
are not subject to IA, and conversely less important proposals are subject to 
IA.51 This, of course, does not go in the direction of an efficient use of 
resources that can be allocated to better regulation tools.  
                                                      
49 Except for initiatives of a consultative or purely reporting nature. 
50 See the new Impact Assessment Guidelines, SEC(2009)92, at Section 1.4. 
51 In the past, some stakeholders have complained about the lack of IA for some 
initiatives, especially in the field of consumer policy, and legal issues (the “Rome I” 
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Better ‘targeting’ of IA efforts and resource, by linking them to clear 
priorities in the EU agenda, has been invoked by authoritative scholars in 
the field.52 A first step accomplished by the Commission is the 
identification of ‘strategic’ initiatives, as opposed to ‘priority’ initiatives in 
yearly Roadmaps since 2007. As stated by President Barroso in presenting 
the 2007 Work Programme, strategic initiatives correspond to “the concrete 
actions at the core of the Commission’s political delivery”, whereas priority 
initiatives seem to play a somewhat less crucial role with respect to the EU 
agenda.53  
However, the difference between the two types of initiatives in terms 
of depth and scope of the IA work to be performed is still, at best, implicit. 
Looking at the 21 strategic initiatives selected for 2007, it emerges that some 
of them were not subject to IA (social reality stocktaking, green papers on 
urban transport and on post-2012 climate change, the Single Market 
review); of remaining strategic priorities, some were non-legislative 
proposals, others were binding proposals. Overall, it seems that some of 
the strategic priorities were subject to a more in-depth IA than non-
strategic ones:54 the sign is probably still too weak to suggest that the 
Commission has started to prioritise more efficiently its IA work, but the 
identification of strategic initiatives that fall more in line with key EU 
objectives and top agenda items is certainly an encouraging first step.  
In any event, a number of issues remain unclear, including:  
•  How strategic initiatives are selected and distinguished from priority ones. 
Here, the Commission hints at “the four strategic objectives set out by 
the Barroso Commission at the start of its mandate: prosperity, 
solidarity, security and external responsibility” as a criterion for 
determining the strategic nature of a proposal. But the four pillars of 
the Barroso agenda are probably too broadly expressed to lead to any 
                                                      
52 Radaelli & Meuwese (2008), supra note 43. 
53 See the Work Programmes at 
http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/programmes/index_en.htm. 
54 For example, the Strategic review of EU energy policy, the measures to complete 
the Internal Market for electricity and gas; the revision of Council Framework 
decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism; the Directive on minimum 
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meaningful demarcation. One possible solution to this problem could 
be that yearly roadmaps are subject to public consultation, which 
would however add another procedural layer in an already quite 
complex procedure. Such a change in the lifecycle of EU proposals 
would be feasible only if a specific body in charge of representing 
industry and consumer interests within the Commission were 
created. This point is discussed in greater detail below in the 
dedicated Section on oversight. 
•  Whether strategic initiatives could (should) be subject to a more detailed IA 
–  in other words, whether the dichotomy between strategic and 
priority initiatives could be a useful ‘litmus test’ to identify those 
initiatives that warrant an in-depth ex ante assessment.55  
The Expert Group participants have positively commented on the 
latter option, not because strategic initiatives always lead to more 
substantial economic, social or environmental impacts, but because they are 
“the concrete actions at the core of the Commission’s political delivery”, 
and as such should warrant a more significant allocation of resources and 
deeper accountability on the Commission’s side. 
2.2  Tackling proportionality 
Due to the heterogeneity of initiatives subject to appraisal, the depth of 
analysis cannot be the same for each and every proposal. The ‘valve’ that 
determines the depth and scope of appraisal at EU level is the so-called 
‘principle of proportionate analysis’, which links the depth of the analysis 
to the nature and type of the initiative to be analysed. In the new IA 
guidelines adopted in January 2009, the Commission elaborates on the 2005 
guidelines by providing further assistance to DGs on how to apply the 
principle of proportionality.56 The new proposal by the Commission entails 
that the level of analysis which is proportionate should relate to the entire 
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impacts than strategic initiatives, and sometimes even items not included in the 
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See Craig Robertson’s post on the Bertelsmann’s Virtual Working Group on the EU 
better regulation agenda (https://wiki.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/display/br/ 
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IA process, including for example data collection, provisions for 
stakeholder consultation and quantification of impacts.  
The criteria proposed by the Commission to assess the depth and 
scope of analysis to be undertaken are the significance of likely impacts, the 
political importance of the initiative, and the situation in the context of 
policy development. Understandably, the Commission does not rigidly 
specify the depth of analysis for specific types of initiatives, stating that it 
will be “content rather than any formal classification that determines the 
degree of analysis needed”.  
For guidance purposes, the Commission points at the following 
‘categories’ of initiatives: i) non-legislative initiatives/Communications/ 
Recommendations/ White papers, which set out commitment for future 
legislative actions; ii) ‘cross-cutting’ legislative actions, such as regulations 
and directives that address broad issues and are likely to have significant 
impacts in at least two of the three pillars (economic, environmental and 
social) and on a wide range of stakeholders across different sectors; iii) 
‘narrow’ legislative action in a particular field or sector, and unlikely to 
have significant impacts beyond the immediate policy area; v) expenditure 
programmes; and vi) comitology decisions. 
Overall, looking at all IAs produced to date, it seems that the depth of 
analysis is only marginally related to the binding nature of the proposal. 
Also, a significant number of IAs completed by the Commission do not 
address real policy initiatives, and resemble more closely ex post or interim 
evaluation reports.57 Finally, some DGs have performed IAs mostly on non-
legislative initiatives – including AGRI (9 out of 12), COMM (1 of 1), COMP 
(2 of 3), DEV (11 out of 13), RELEX (4 out of 5). 
More in general, the 2009 guidelines have improved over the 
previous version, which provided little or almost no guidance for DGs 
wishing to undertake IA. However, it is unclear why the Commission 
seems to ask DGs to devote limited effort to the analysis of the relevance 
and consistency with EU priorities when drafting IAs on non-legislative 
documents, whose main purpose is indeed to explore the direction in 
which future action at Community level should proceed. Apart from cases 
in which sophisticated analysis is needed already at an early stage, the 
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most important purpose of appraisal at this preliminary stage is often 
assessing the consistency of the proposed action with the agenda priorities 
set at EU level.  
Secondly, the ‘no policy change’ scenario  seems to be almost 
neglected in the first steps of the analysis, as the Commission suggests that 
DGs to refrain from investing too much on the zero option – and 
consequently, on the need for action – in the early steps of the policy cycle. 
Imagine that a proposal X is considered in a White Paper and in a 
subsequent Communication, and then reaches a stage in which a Directive 
is being prepared. It may happen, at a late stage, that a more thorough 
analysis of the zero option reveals that no other option is superior to the 
status quo, or at least that there is no certainty that intervention at 
Community level could do better than either no action or action at member 
state level.  
Thirdly, the role of quantification should be clarified. Looking at the 
new guidelines, full quantification seems to be absolutely required only for 
expenditure programmes (and only for costs), not for narrow policy actions 
and not for broader policy initiatives. Quantification, in other systems such 
as the US, plays a much bigger role: it is then worth discussing whether the 
Commission’s choice marks a definitive departure from the concept of IA 
as a quantification tool and ‘net benefit’ enabler, towards use of IA as a 
‘policy dialogue’ tool.  
Fourthly, the current, ‘flexible’ application of the proportionality 
principle leads to difficulties in evaluating the Commission performance, 
both in individual initiatives and in aggregate terms. As in Cecot, Hahn, 
Renda & Schrefler (2008), and as acknowledged also by other scholars, 
there is room for recommending that the EU explicitly require that more 
economically significant initiatives receive higher levels of scrutiny (as is 
currently done in the US for proposed regulations). Furthermore, the EU 
should identify the level of analysis that is expected for each policy proposal 
beforehand, and indicate the timing of the analysis alongside the steps of 
the policy process.58 In this respect, proportionality is clearly linked to 
accountability. 
                                                      
58 As stated by Cecot, Hahn, Renda & Schrefler (2008),  “An Evaluation of the 
Quality of Impact Assessment in the European Union with Lessons for the U.S. and 
the EU”, Regulation & Governance (2):4, December, pp. 405-424: “[t]his requirement 
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As recalled already in the Mandelkern report, IA is often a question 
of “asking the right thing, at the right time, in the right sequence”. 
Accordingly, a ‘policy cycle’ approach to the selection of the ‘right 
questions’ to be addressed at each policy stage is needed to ensure that 
resources are correctly allocated. Against this background, using IA 
efficiently means investing effort and resources in ex ante appraisal up to 
the point where the input provided by the IA allows the decision-maker to 
make ‘the right choice’, or at least a reasonably educated guess.59 
For example, failing to assess the impact of the zero option and to 
perform the subsidiarity test at an early stage of the policy process can lead 
to undesirable results in terms of the efficiency of the overall process: what 
happens if, after an IA on a broad strategy document, in the IA on the final 
legislative document the analysis of the zero option (or, also, the 
subsidiarity test) shows that the proposal is a dead end, at least in cost-
benefit terms? Many resources would have been invested in vain.60 
Conversely, investing too much effort in quantifying the impact of specific 
policy measures already at the White Paper stage makes little sense from an 
economic perspective, as the final policy choice will be taken only after a 
                                                                                                                                       
w o u l d  m a k e  i t  e a s i e r  t o  i d e n t i f y  a n a l y s e s  t h a t  f a l l  s h o r t  o f  e x p e c t a t i o n s ,  t h u s  
creating a mechanism for holding the EU more accountable”. 
59 A useful example is the impact assessment performed on White Papers. As these 
documents normally contain an indication of the direction the Commission has 
decided to undertake in order to address a specific policy problem, the key issues 
that should be tackled at this stage certainly include a thorough assessment of the 
need to intervene, and to do it at EU level. Thus, the subsidiarity test and the 
analysis of the zero option should play a paramount role in these IAs; in addition, 
a scenario analysis corresponding to alternative policy choices is certainly helpful 
to justify a specific approach the Commission considers to be preferable over 
alternative policy choices. Depending on the type of proposal at hand, this may 
require: i) the use of law and economics analysis, which compares alternative 
options without a specific need for a quantification of the impacts of policy options 
that are still rather vaguely defined; and/or ii) the use of scenario analysis, in 
which different assumptions are factored in a single model to yield final impacts or 
ranges of impacts. 
60 On the Bertelsmann’s Virtual Working group’s website, Craig Robertson 
correctly points out that IAs showing negative impacts do not necessarily indicate 
a “dead end”, as IA is not a replacement, but only a support to political decision-
making. However, this does not affect the conclusion that the zero option is a 
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new legislative document, at least two rounds of consultation, the opinions 
of a number of EU institutions (ESC, CoR, etc.) and the input of Parliament 
and Council. Currently, many IAs performed by the Commission carry an 
in-depth analysis of options that are not translated into final policy choices 
at the end of the legislative iter.61  
The Commission is now putting more emphasis on the need to avoid 
duplications and choose the right timing for investing IA resources along 
the policy cycle. A possible way to approach the problem of timing and 
efficient use of resources is to revisit the IA guidelines by creating an 
‘incremental’ approach to IA. As shown in Figure 1 below, a representative 
(and simplified) policy cycle may entail three IA steps:62 
•  After the Green Paper stage, the first IA is normally performed on the 
way towards the White Paper (alternatively, this could be a COM 
stage). In this phase, the key questions to be addressed are:  
i)  Is there a problem? For example, is there a market failure? Is 
there a major legal issue? Or, is there a clear policy proposal 
that appears as potentially improving over the status quo?  
ii)  Is action at EU level needed? Is there a policy goal set at EU level 
that could not be achieved absent action at EU level? Is action at 
EU level superior to action by member states? 
                                                      
61 For example, the IA on the proposed “Directive on the cross-border transfer of 
registered office” in 2007 concluded that it was “not clear that adopting a directive 
would represent the least onerous way of achieving the objectives set”, and that it 
would be “more appropriate to wait until the impacts of those developments can 
be fully assessed and the need and scope for any EU action better defined”. 
However desirable this result may appear, it must also be noticed that it was 
reached after two rounds of consultation (1997 and 2002), the work performed by a 
high-level group and a constant involvement of stakeholders before the IA was 
finally performed on the proposed directive. Part of this effort could have been 
avoided, had the IA been carried out at an earlier stage with a specific focus on the 
“zero option”, subsidiarity and proportionality. The same can be said of other IAs, 
such as the IA on the “Proportionality between Capital and Control in Listed 
Companies”. 
62 The figure was already included in Renda (2008), Advancing the EU better 
regulation agenda: Selected challenges, Bertelsmann Stiftung Working Paper 
(http://www.irr-network.org/document/172/Andrea_Renda_-2008a_ 
Advancing_the_EU_Better_Regulation_Agenda-_Selected_Challenges.html).  46 | BETTER REGULATION 
iii)  What alternative policy options may be envisaged? Is any of the 
options clearly superior to the others? Do these options differ 
noticeably in terms of expected compliance and ease of 
monitoring and enforcement? 
Needless to say, if these questions are answered negatively, the IA 
would indicate a ‘dead end’.  
•  Once the White Paper sets the general approach that can be 
undertaken by the Commission, a consultation process leads to the 
refinement of such approach, and its translation into concrete policy 
proposals. This is the stage at which more in-depth analyses such as 
cost-benefit analysis (CBA) or cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) of 
individual options must be undertaken. CBA and CEA, in particular, 
perform best when they compare homogeneous options within a 
common underlying regulatory approach; otherwise, different time 
horizons, different legal and regulatory tools, different assumptions 
on compliance and enforcement may lead to misleading results; in 
addition, performing CBA or CEA at an earlier stage faces the risk of 
wasting resources – whereas the Commission should avoid having to 
‘reinvent the wheel’ every time stakeholder consultation of opinions 
of other EU institutions leads to a change in the regulatory options at 
stake.  
•  Finally, as will be clarified in the next sections of this paper, the IA 
should be updated to reflect the amendments introduced by the 
Parliament and the Council during co-decision. 
Figure 2.1 An example of ‘incremental IA’ 
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This implies that the Impact Assessment Guidelines should be 
amended to reflect a more logical sequence of analysis throughout the 
policy cycle, including: 
•  The need to tackle subsidiarity and the zero option at an early stage 
of analysis. 
•  The need to avoid redundancies in IA throughout the policy cycle. 
•  The need to follow an incremental approach to Impact Assessment. 
•  The need to devote more resources to strategic IAs as opposed to 
other IAs. 
The proposed expert group to be created (see below, Section 6) 
should be given this as a specific task.  
2.3  Strengthening the Commission’s accountability towards other EU 
institutions 
Since the Expert Group has highlighted the need for an expanded role of 
the Commission in performing IAs on major amendments tabled by the 
Parliament and the Council during co-decision procedures – at least for 
strategic initiatives – the need to redefine the role of other EU institutions 
has emerged. In this respect, an efficient division of roles between the 
Commission, Parliament and Council entails that the Commission takes 
responsibility for drafting IAs, and the other institutions are more heavily 
involved in the selection of initiatives that warrant a more in-depth IA.  
More in detail, Expert Group participants have observed that the 
European Parliament is unlikely to develop sufficient in-house IA resources 
overtime. To the contrary, the Parliament needs considering a stronger 
involvement in the selection of priorities in the EU agenda, including those 
strategic priorities that would deserve careful scrutiny through an in-depth 
IA.  
This new division of roles between EU institutions would possess a 
number of virtues. First, it would centralise the competence for IA in the 
Commission, thus creating economies of scale and scope. Secondly, it 
would preserve and strengthen the Commission’s accountability vis-à-vis 
the Parliament and the Council, as the former would be carrying out the IA 
work in response to a specific call from the more ‘political’ EU institutions, 
ensuring that they always decide on the basis of updated evidence and a 
structured rationale for action. Thirdly, it would solve the problem of the 
‘Common approach’, which so far has yielded only disappointing results, 
at the same time ensuring the commitment of all institutions towards better 48 | BETTER REGULATION 
lawmaking. Finally, such a solution would reflect the enhanced role 
attributed to the European Parliament by the Treaty of Lisbon. 
Hence the European Parliament and the Council should be more 
involved in the selection of the (‘strategic’) initiatives that should undergo 
in-depth IA every year. 
2.4  Making sense of the administrative burdens measurement 
Over the past few years, and in particular since the end of 2006, the EU 
better regulation debate has placed substantial emphasis on the 
measurement and reduction of administrative burdens. This methodology 
relies on the EU variant of the Standard Cost Model (SCM) developed in 
the Netherlands since the 1990s. The EU SCM, originally conceived only as 
a methodology for calculating administrative burdens in individual IAs 
(and included in the IA guidelines since March 2006 as Annex 10), has later 
evolved into a tool for completing a baseline measurement of the ‘stock’ of 
administrative burdens created by EU legislation in as many as thirteen 
priority areas, undertaken by a consortium of consultancy firms. This 
measurement will later be translated into concrete reduction proposals 
with the contribution of the High Level Group of independent stakeholders 
(the ‘Stoiber group’). Meanwhile, the Commission has also identified a set 
of ‘Fast Track Actions’, some of which have already been undertaken.  
Following the launch of the EU Action Programme for the 
measurement and reduction of administrative burdens in the EU, which set 
a 25% target reduction of administrative burdens by 2012, the spring 2007 
meeting of the Council has called for a commitment by member states 
towards a similar reduction for administrative burdens created by national 
legislation. So far, at least 21 member states have committed to such a 
reduction.  
The Expert Group has debated the merit of proceeding with the EU 
Action Programme on measuring and reducing administrative burdens. 
Opinions widely diverged, with some participants advocating for more 
emphasis on IA and much less on the SCM, and other that – though 
acknowledging the non-scientific nature of the measurement – consider it 
to be anyway useful for businesses. In this respect, it must be recalled that 
the SCM: i) has a much narrower scope than the impact assessment tool; ii) 
does not consider all categories of costs, but only burdens generated by 
information obligations included in pieces of legislation; and iii) does not 
consider the benefits associated with those costs.  
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Expert Group participants agreed on the following issues:  
•  the scope of the burden measurement exercise is currently too narrow. 
However, some participants observed that this should discourage EU 
and national policy-makers from investing in the measurement in the 
years to come; whereas others consider this as grounds for expanding 
the scope of the measurement to other categories of costs – most 
notably, compliance costs.  
•  Whatever amount of resources is allocated to the measurement of 
administrative burdens, this should not subtract resources from IA and 
other better regulation tools. Ex ante impact assessment, ex post 
evaluation and simplification initiatives are too important for Europe 
to be ‘sacrificed on the altar’ of administrative burdens.  
Looking more closely at the current features of the administrative 
burdens measurement, a number of issues are particularly relevant:  
•  Should the target be ‘net’? Target setting is quite important since, 
though the Commission has committed to achieve a 25% reduction 
before 2012, it is still unclear whether the target will be a ‘net’ one – 
which includes all new legislation that will be adopted by 2012 – or 
whether it will be a reduction over the stock measured in 2012, 
regardless of whether EU legislation will introduce, in the 
meanwhile, additional burdens. The issue has been discussed several 
times at national level, with governments setting ‘net’ targets as a 
commitment towards real relief from red tape for businesses. 
Sophisticated measures have been put in place, including, e.g. 
compensation rules and other arrangements that ensure that, overall, 
the stock of ABs does not increase overtime, frustrating any attempt 
to achieve the desired target. Should the EU target also be ‘net’, 
administrative burdens would have to be calculated for each and 
every new proposal falling in the thirteen priority areas – i.e. the 
Commission should quantify administrative burdens reduced and 
added for each and every new proposal, including the burdens 
added/repealed by subsequent amendments proposed by the 
Parliament and the Council.  
•  Should the baseline be ‘live’? A similar conclusion would be reached if 
the Commission clarified that the baseline that will be built with the 
ongoing measurement exercise will have to be kept ‘live’, i.e. 
constantly updated through IAs performed by Commission DGs. 
This type of activity would not be feasible unless the Commission: i) 
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binding proposals, when such proposals are likely to have a 
significant impact on burdens; ii) always updates its IA on the basis of 
amendments proposed by the Parliament and the Council, when 
these amendments are deemed likely to significantly affect 
administrative burdens. Against this background, the Commission 
often does not apply the SCM in its IAs on binding proposals. The 
SCM was applied only in two IAs in 2007 (Postal services and ban on 
mercury exports), and was later used on the Fast Track proposals 
issued within the Action Programme on the measurement of 
administrative burdens.63 
Hence, if the Standard Cost Model is to become an ongoing effort at 
EU level, the current situation offers little beacons of hope. In an attempt to 
formulate constructive suggestions for the near future, the following issues 
should be taken into account: 
•  The scope of the measurement should be expanded. The  Expert Group 
advocates for: i) an extension of the ongoing measurement to other 
priority areas beyond the thirteen m e a s u r e d  s o  f a r ,  t o  c o v e r  a l l  
relevant areas and thus build a full baseline; and ii) an extension of 
the scope of the SCM methodology to irritation burdens and 
compliance costs other than mere administrative burdens, in line 
with the recent evolution of the SCM undertaken in the Netherlands, 
and recommended by the OECD and World Bank.  
•  Stronger coordination between the EU and national measurements of 
administrative burdens should be ensured, as way to enable convergence of 
better regulation system in the EU27. The European Commission, in its 
                                                      
63 Recently, a joint letter by the UK Better Regulation Commission, the Dutch Actal 
and the German Nationaler Normenkontrollrat advocated for more comprehensive 
measurement of administrative burdens at EU level: interestingly, the three 
institutions advocated for the application of the SCM on ‘all’ new initiative, not 
only those included in the CLWG, and not only those that undergo IA 
(http://www.normenkontrollrat.bund.de/Webs/NKR/Content/DE/Publikatione
n/Anlagen/positionspapier-zum-aktionsprogramm-der-eu-englisch,property= 
publicationFile.pdf), “[a]n ex-ante measurement of administrative burdens only 
needs to be carried out for initiatives that are likely to impose significant 
administrative costs (principle of proportionate analysis). Since the transparency of 
administrative burdens is vital, we recommend that it is mandatory for every new 
Commission initiative to have a comprehensible statement about the 
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Communication on the second strategic review of better regulation in 
the European Union, has stated the need for increased involvement of 
member states as a key step towards mainstreaming better regulation 
in the whole policy cycle to the benefit of EU citizens. However, so far 
most national governments have failed to include better regulation 
tools and particularly IA in their agendas, despite the fact that these 
tools stand at the forefront of the Lisbon agenda. Conversely, the 
SCM has become way more widespread and standardised than IA in 
member states, and the commitment by all member states to achieve 
a 25% reduction of administrative burdens certainly represents the 
most important multi-level commitment ever observed in the better 
regulation field at EU level. As a result, the SCM could be a useful 
forerunner for more convergent better regulation agendas at member 
state level, and in particular for mainstreaming IA into the policy-
making cycle. In order to achieve this result, more coordination 
between the administrative burdens measurement at EU and national 
level should be sought. This could be a task for the expert group to be 
appointed, as described in Section 6 below.  
2.5  Involving member states 
Looking at the future of better regulation in the European Union, it bears 
recalling that, although the EU system can be improved in several ways, 
most member states are far behind the EU in setting up their own better 
regulation system, despite the fact that the Lisbon strategy explicitly 
required them to take action in this direction. As already mentioned, one of 
the key messages launched by the Commission in its Communication on 
the second strategic review of better regulation in the EU is that “[t]he 
Better Regulation Agenda is already bringing concrete benefits for 
businesses and consumers”, but at the same time “the full benefits will only 
be obtained if all European Institutions and member states work 
together”.64 
More in detail, as was observed by some commentators, there is 
currently a wide adoption-implementation gap at national level, with many 
member states claiming to have adopted some form of impact assessment 
methodology, but very few of them actually having mainstreamed IA into 
                                                      
64 See the Consultation document, available on the Commission’s website at 
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/consultation/ia_consultation_en.htm. 52 | BETTER REGULATION 
their policy-making process. As a result, a full-fledged IA system appears 
to be missing in most member states, with very few exceptions. In this 
respect, it must be recalled that absence of evidence-based policy-making at 
national level can negatively affect the Internal Market, especially as 
regards the different legal systems faced by firms wishing to engage in 
cross-border trade. As an example, Swedish firms wishing to operate 
outside national borders may be harmed by inefficient legislation adopted 
in other countries. 
In short, placing the emphasis only on the EU level would miss the 
broader picture of better regulation in Europe. Striving to reach an optimal 
balance in Brussels would be almost useless, if member states do not 
contribute to better regulation by ensuring the timely, effective and 
efficient transposition, implementation and enforcement of EU legislation. 
In this respect, a degree of convergence between the EU and national IA 
systems would also entail that EU IAs serve as a basis for implementation 
in member states, and that impact assessment can be performed at national 
level as an ‘add-on’ to what the European Commission has analysed in its 
own IA document.65 
Achieving convergence between the EU and national better 
regulation systems should thus be considered as a key priority in the next 
years. The opportunity to create commitments and responsibility at the 
member state level should be seized, possibly with focus on the adoption of 
a common system of indicators.  
2.6  A new ‘Mandelkern group’? 
The CEPS-CSE Expert Group on better regulation took as a starting point 
for its work the Council’s 18-month programme jointly drafted by the 
French, Czech and Swedish presidencies where advancement of the better 
regulation agenda is considered to be essential for the future of the EU. The 
three consecutive Presidencies commit, i.a. to “make sure that impact 
assessments will take into account the economic, social and environmental 
impacts and that they will be more systematically examined”. In addition, 
“efforts will continue to be made to improve the quality of impact 
assessments and to further strengthen procedures for external stakeholder 
                                                      
65 Please note that this is possible only if the Commission updates the IA 
throughout the policy cycle, thus throughout the co-decision procedure. See supra, 
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consultation.” Moreover, the three Presidencies “will also closely monitor 
progress towards the target of reducing the administrative burdens arising 
from EU-legislation by 25 per cent by 2012.” 
The Expert Group participants have agreed that the most effective 
way to leave a decisive mark on the future of better regulation in the EU 
and member states would be to appoint a group of experts in charge of the 
following activities:  
i)  Communicating the importance of the EU better regulation agenda, and the 
impact it has had on EU policy-making since its inception (2003). This 
includes the use of indicators of regulatory quality and the 
identification of cases in which better regulation tools have ‘made a 
difference’ in EU policy-making. Indicators of regulatory quality 
should be promoted both in ex ante IA (in the section on monitoring 
and evaluation), and in the ex post evaluation of proposals. 
ii)  Identifying and proposing detailed criteria for selecting in-depth IAs to be 
undertaken every year. This entails discussing the criteria that should 
be used to identify the initiatives that should undergo in-depth IAs, 
and the consequent application of the proportionality principle to in-
depth v. less detailed IAs. 
iii)  Discuss changes in the IA guidelines, especially for what concerns the 
proportionality principle and the ‘incremental’ or ‘sequential’ 
approach to IA, as described above. 
iv)  Re-designing the process by securing the involvement of all EU institutions 
in the definition of strategic initiatives. This entails the discussion on the 
future of the inter-institutional agreement on better lawmaking, in 
line with our recommendations on the need for an expanded role of 
the Commission in drafting IAs on amendments, and a stronger role 
of institutions in selecting strategic initiatives that should undergo in-
depth IAs.  
v)  Discussing the pros and cons of opening draft IAs to consultation. Besides 
discussing the merit of the proposal per se, the expert group should 
also clarify the modes and conditions of such a consultation, mostly 
to ensure that it does not lead to ‘opening Pandora’s box’, but is 
limited to the collection of opinions on the quality of IAs, and is then 
used as a basis for the IAB in deciding whether the Commission’s 
original IA has satisfied the proportionality principle and is sound 
enough to provide a basis for decision-making by other EU 
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vi)  Discussing the merit of a roadmap towards the convergence of EU and 
national better regulation agendas, including multi-level convergence of IA 
systems. This is a more forward-looking activity, which includes both 
the future convergence of IA systems at EU and national level, 
including the setting of a common set of indicators; and the 
possibility to start from the current spread of the SCM to reach a 
much broader convergence of better regulation systems, as originally 
advocated by the Lisbon agenda. 
If future EU Presidencies follow the present suggestion and promotes 
the creation of an expert group in charge of looking into the future of the 
EU better regulation system, this would occur almost ten years after the 
Mandelkern Group started its work, which laid the foundations of today’s 
better regulation system in the EU. However, as observed by a number of 
Expert Group participants, the new group would have a different mandate 
compared to the Mandelkern Group. While the Mandelkern Group paved 
the way towards a more comprehensive better regulation agenda in the EU, 
the future expert group would take stock on the important achievements to 
date, and look at how to advance the better regulation agenda in the years 
to come. As a consequence, while the Mandelkern Group was essentially 
composed by representatives of member states, the future group of experts 
should be composed mostly by field experts and representatives from all 
EU institutions. 
2.7  Concluding remarks 
In light of the above, the Expert Group identified the following key 
suggestions for improving the current and future performance of the better 
regulation strategy in the EU and its member states.  
At the EU level, the European Commission should: 
•  perform in-depth IAs only on ‘strategic’ initiatives. 
•  perform and update its IAs throughout the policy cycle.  
•  publish draft IAs for consultation. 
•  plan IA work efficiently;  
•  efficiently allocate resources between ex ante impact assessment and 
ex post evaluation; 
The  European Parliament should instead act as an ‘informal 
watchdog’ in the EU better regulation system. 
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From a longer-term perspective:  
•  The scope and role of the measurement of administrative burdens 
should be clarified.  
•  The burdens measurement should be used as a driver for the 
convergence of IA systems in the EU. 
•  A ‘new Mandelkern group’, with focus on advancing the EU better 
regulation agenda should be launched. 
•  A common set of IA quality indicators should be envisaged to foster 
the convergence of EU and national IA systems.   
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3.  IMPLEMENTATION AND SUBSIDIARITY 
LOURDES ACEDO MONTOYA
∗ & LORNA 
SCHREFLER 
ver the past few years, significant progress towards the completion 
of the European Internal Market for goods, services, people and 
capital has been achieved. However, geographical barriers have not 
yet fully come down; indeed, as was authoritatively observed, key 
economic areas still exhibit incomplete harmonisation partially stemming 
from regulatory failure, and this significantly hinders the possibility for 
businesses and citizens to reap the benefits of a single European market.66 
In this context, improved regulatory quality is expected to boost European 
competitiveness and deepen the Internal Market. Most European 
institutions, within the context of the Single Market Review, have recently 
highlighted the need to strengthen the harmonisation of rules to ensure 
that European businesses and citizens fully benefit from the Internal 
Market.67 
As was highlighted by, among others, the Sapir Report in 2003, a key 
question is whether remaining shortcomings in the economic integration of 
the EU can be traced back to ‘fault lines in its patterns of governance’. The 
Report identified three possible sources of failure:  
                                                      
∗ This chapter was drafted in the rapporteur’s former capacity as a researcher in 
CEPS Regulatory Affairs research unit. 
66 SEC(2007)1521. 
67 See for example, European Commission (2007), “A single market for 21st century 
Europe”, COM(2007)724, 20.11.2007; European Parliament, resolution of 12 
December 2007 on the Commission legislative and work programme for 2008. 
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i)  a policy may be not clearly (or mistakenly) allocated between the EU and 
the member state levels with respect to the objective that is being 
pursued (either inappropriate centralisation or decentralisation). 
Subsidiarity is therefore key to regulatory quality both in economic 
and political terms. By empowering the relevant government level 
one satisfies cost/benefit efficiency criteria while reinforcing policy 
ownership and commitment.  
ii)  a policy may be appropriately allocated, but its design or 
implementation may be deficient because of an institutional failure or the 
lack of appropriate instruments. Thus, one may identify problems 
derived from failure to monitor/coordinate the implementation of 
EU legislation at national level and problems arising from 
inconsistencies between national and European legislation. Recent 
legal and economic literature puts the blame on member states both 
for incorrect transposition and for non homogenous implementation 
of EU law.68 
iii)  the failure can be entirely internal to a policy domain, because either 
the goals, or the strategy, or the policy instruments are not 
appropriate. In this case, better Impact Assessments will undoubtedly 
help to define the best policy options on the basis of a qualitative and 
quantitative analysis.69 Defining straightforward techniques to choose 
the right policy option (i.e., a functional application of the 
subsidiarity and the proportionality principles) is, therefore, key to 
the success of a legislative measure. 
In a multi-tiered governance system, such as the European one, better 
lawmaking is a matter of every layer of government, from the EU level to 
the level of regions having legislative powers, regions belonging to federal 
states, and regions in decentralised states. Ultimately, the success of any 
initiative hinges on the active and resolute participation of member states, 
regions, and EU institutions. 
                                                      
68 For further details, see B. Steunenberg (2005), “Turning swift policy-making into 
deadlock and delay: national policy coordination and the transposition of EU 
directives”,  European Union Politics 7 (3): 293-319; Ph. Nicolaides and H. Oberg 
(2006), “The Compliance Problem in the European Union”, EIPAScope, 2006(1): 12-
18. 
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The Expert Group identified and discussed several possible solutions 
to enhance the convergence of legislation and regulatory practices in the 
Internal Market, while ensuring the necessary balance between legal 
security and flexibility. With a specific focus on the development of a more 
competitive Europe, these suggestions are built around three specific 
issues: a proper application of the subsidiarity principle, a proportionate 
application of the spectrum of legislative measures and the reinforcement 
of the relationship between member states and European institutions to 
ensure an effective and homogeneous application of European law. The 
first two points pertain to questions of regulatory quality and are jointly 
addressed in section 1; while issues related to implementation and to the 
coordination between the EU and its member states are addressed in 
sections 2 and 3 respectively. 
3.1  Regulatory quality: Achieving a suitable regulatory environment 
for European businesses 
There is a common understanding across Europe of the importance of 
regulatory quality for boosting ‘growth and jobs’, improving 
‘competitiveness’ and releasing the single market potential.70 In this 
context, the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, as well as their 
practical implementation deserve particular attention.71 
Subsidiarity and proportionality are the only principles of regulatory 
quality to be explicitly enshrined in the EC Treaty. As regards subsidiarity, 
the Treaty clearly states that the principle applies to those areas that do not 
fall under the exclusive competence of the Community.72 In those cases, 
                                                      
70 Regulatory quality is normally used as a synonym of better regulation or better 
lawmaking. In general, however, one should consider regulatory quality as a 
consequence of better regulation, or in other words as a broader concept that may 
imply changes in decision-making structures or the use of new tools to assess 
regulatory efficiency. The positive effects of better regulation have been repeatedly 
described in several official documents (both at EU and member state level), see i.a. 
COM (2005)97, COM(2002)278, the Mandelkern Report (2001) and COM(2007)724. 
71 On the other dimensions of the overall quality of decision-making and the 
Mandelkern principles of better regulation, see the previous chapters. 
72 In a multi-tiered structure as the European Union, the allocation of public 
functions must comply with the subsidiarity principle as specified in Art. 5 TEC 
and the Protocol annexed to the Amsterdam Treaty which will be incorporated to 
the new Lisbon Treaty. If one accepts the constitutional logic of the Treaty, 
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action at EU level is only justified insofar as the objectives of the proposed 
measure cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states, but “non-
action by member states does not in itself create EU competence”.73 Several 
documents have recently linked the goal of enhancing convergence in the 
Internal Market with a correct application of the principle of subsidiarity.74 
On the application of the proportionality principle, the new Impact 
Assessment (IA) guidelines call for a systematic analysis of alternative 
policy options (including no new EU action) to compare the cost and 
benefits of stringent vs. lax policy measures. This approach complies with 
the Treaty requirement foreseeing that Community action should be as 
simple as possible while achieving its objectives. In particular, the new IA 
guidelines provide detailed information and guidance on the practical 
application of the proportionality principle.75  
                                                                                                                                       
subsidiarity can solely be applied to so-called ‘shared powers’. Should the Treaty 
of Lisbon enter into force, this article will become Art. 3b, to be read jointly with 
Art. 3a. As a matter of fact, the Lisbon Treaty clearly specifies the domains of 
‘shared powers’ in Art. 2C. One of the main innovations of the Treaty is thus the 
clear distinction between the policy domains falling within the competence of 
member states, from those of exclusive EU competence and those where 
competences are shared. Only the latter are affected by the principle of 
subsidiarity, and this clarification represents a major step towards a proper 
application of the principle. 
73 European Parliament, ibid, pp. 52-54.  
74 The French submission to the consultation on the future of the Internal Market, 
for example, clearly states that “[a]reas and sectors of activity where greater 
integration is needed have to be identified. T h i s  m u s t  b e  d o n e  bearing in mind a 
balanced application of the principle of subsidiarity by determining the relevant level of 
intervention (EU or national).” The French report pointed specifically at areas such 
as financial services, regulation of energy and telecommunications, taxation, 
company law, consumer protection and intellectual property as those in which 
greater convergence should be sought. Republique Française (2006), “French 
contribution to the European Commission’s public consultation on the future of 
the Internal Market”, September. 
75 For further details, see section 7.2 of the 2009 European Commission Impact 
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3.1.1  What subsidiarity for Europe? 
Any discussion on the application of the subsidiarity principle should start 
from the roots of the concept, namely giving priority to local preferences in 
policy-making, unless overridden by proper justification, which render 
local or national law – or policy-making ineffective or inefficient. Then, 
decentralisation will be preferred when preferences differ substantially 
among member states; while centralisation will be applied where there is 
room for economies of scale and there are cross-border external effects of 
national policies.76 
Improving the allocation of public functions between the member 
states and the EU level can be expected to result in a better functioning of 
the European Union, hence, in greater legitimacy of the EU for its citizens 
and superior economic performance arising from higher efficiency and 
effectiveness. Yet, the attribution of competences has a strong political 
component, so a purely technical analysis of the subsidiarity principle is 
extremely complicated. As a matter of fact, three approaches can be 
identified behind the principle of subsidiarity: procedural (legalistic), 
functional, and political. In what follows, the focus will be mainly on the 
functional aspects of subsidiarity, without neglecting the other dimensions. 
This is motivated by the fact that in 90% of the cases the application of the 
subsidiarity principle does not cause any problem and hence does not slow 
down the legislative machine.77 As for the remaining 10% of the cases, they 
need to be addressed more thoroughly in order to ensure a successful and 
correct implementation of EU law. These cases will often touch upon the 
political dimension of the subsidiarity principle and – under those 
circumstances – a functional approach is likely to increase the quality and 
the transparency of the policy process. 
All institutions are obliged to comply with the subsidiarity principle 
and they are also involved in some form or another in its application. The 
Commission – for instance – must justify every legislative proposal on the 
grounds of subsidiarity and present an annual report that can be assessed 
by the other institutions. Amendments by the Council and the European 
Parliament must also be subsidiarity compliant. The consultative bodies of 
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Document No. 133, November. 
77 COM(2007)286. POLICY-MAKING IN THE EU | 61 
the EU (CoR and EESC) ensure that subsidiarity is respected from the point 
of view of regional and local authorities and civil society respectively, 
while the Court of Justice can be called to assess the compliance of 
Community secondary legislation with subsidiarity. Therefore, “the current 
system puts the burden of proof on the institutions involved in the Union’s 
legislative process”.78 
Since 2005, the Commission has streamlined the process by using a 
common questionnaire on subsidiarity and by presenting the information 
in the same way in every proposal. Although formally assessing the 
‘necessity’ and ‘need to act in common’ are elements of the subsidiarity 
principle, the questionnaire remains vague in some areas. More specifically, 
there is no mechanism or procedure (as is the case for proportionality in the 
IA guidelines) to quantify those elements, and the use of quantitative 
indicators to measure cross-border spillovers and externalities remains 
optional.  
The Commission, with the assistance of the European Parliament and 
the Committee of the Regions, may therefore envisage preparing specific 
guidelines for the application of subsidiarity that may also be used by 
national Parliaments in order to ensure a homogeneous treatment of 
subsidiarity across Europe. Consequently other institutions and interested 
stakeholders will find it much easier to assess subsidiarity. More efforts in 
this sense should be encouraged, especially once National Parliaments are 
formally involved in the process. 
The rules on the application of the subsidiarity principle, as they 
stand today, allow the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions to issue opinions on the application of the 
principle. Moreover, the Committee of the Regions has recently created the 
Subsidiarity Monitoring Network with the purpose of facilitating the 
exchange of information between the Community and the local and 
regional entities.  
In particular, the Subsidiarity Monitoring Network allows its partners 
to make their voices heard in the decision-making process by commenting 
on policy and legislative proposals from a subsidiarity, proportionality and 
better regulation point of view, whilst at the same time serving as a channel 
to retrieve information on the EU decision-making process.  
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The Network was established in March 2007 and has already been 
consulted three times.79 A first consultation, held in 2007, dealt with the so-
called ‘3rd Energy Package on Electricity and Gas’, while a second one, in 
2007-2008, focused on the areas of immigration and employment. A third 
consultation on ‘patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare’ was launched in 
September 2008.  
Furthermore, following explicit calls in CoR’s opinions,80 and as 
foreseen under the Cooperation Protocol between the European 
Commission and the Committee of the Regions,81 the CoR is strengthening 
its cooperation with the European Commission through its participation in 
selected impact assessment exercises. Local and regional authorities are 
crucial actors in the implementation of many policies and in many cases 
bear the lion's share of the associated costs and burdens. Therefore, their 
point of view on the diverse territorial impacts of a proposed action should 
be taken into account throughout the decision-making process in all 
relevant fields. In the future and further building upon this initiative, it is 
envisaged that members of the Subsidiarity Monitoring Network  be 
consulted in the framework of ad hoc CoR territorial impact assessments of 
European Commission’s proposals early on in the pre-legislative process 
(impact assessment consultations).  
The importance of the regions in the operationalisation of the 
principle of subsidiarity is inextricably related to the role of member states. 
While the practical aspects of implementation directly affect sub-national 
levels of governance, coordination between member states is key for a 
sound linkage between policy-making at the EU level and concrete 
implementation on the ground. As already mentioned in Chapter 1, a 
stronger coordinating role could be envisaged for COSAC and this should 
include the application of subsidiarity. Moreover, the renewed procedures 
and mechanisms foreseen by the Lisbon Treaty call for the establishment of 
a real subsidiarity culture capable of ensuring the effective monitoring of 
the application of the principle by national Parliaments, especially given 
the tight deadlines foreseen. Therefore, cooperation among all the actors 
involved in subsidiarity monitoring at the regional, national and European 
levels is of paramount importance.  
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This also requires better communication among all the actors 
involved, EU institutions and national and regional parliaments. The share 
of best practices and the interaction between national parliaments should 
be encouraged via the development of electronic means specially created to 
this aim and the regular organisation of meetings between parliamentary 
representatives for reviewing and sharing the different approaches to 
subsidiarity. The assistance of the Commission in terms of logistics for the 
creation of electronic means of communication should be further exploited. 
Moreover, the EP provides the ideal forum for sharing best practices 
between national parliaments and the knowledge acquired by the CoR on 
the Subsidiarity Monitoring Network should be shared with national and 
European Members of Parliament. 
3.1.2  Proportionality: Matching the means and the aims 
Improving the governance of the Single Market to make it fully operational 
requires an efficient use of the regulatory tools and processes so as to 
ensure the necessary degree of flexibility and security for all market 
players. The lack of harmonisation observed in various sectors might 
indeed be a consequence of using inappropriate regulatory techniques. In 
fact, the principle of proportionality as stated in the Treaty, “…the 
Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives 
of this Treaty”, already sets the path to follow when preparing a regulatory 
proposal. First, the Commission should clearly identify the objective(s) of a 
proposal and then, it should perform a thorough study of the available 
policy options in order to identify the most efficient and less intrusive one 
(for all stakeholders; national, regional or local governments, businesses 
and citizens). 
Early consultation of all the interested stakeholders will certainly 
improve the quality of legislation and the capacity or readiness of the 
national and regional authorities to apply it.82 Along these lines, efforts 
must be put in place by the European institutions in order to increase the 
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and regional governments early on in the legislative process, problems of 
implementation and financial or administrative cost or burden can be identified 
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involvement of all the relevant stakeholders in the pre-legislative process 
and developing information and communication. 
In addition, the 2009 Impact Assessment guidelines provide specific 
recommendations for the application of the proportionality principle, as 
explained above in Chapter 2. 
Since actions must be proportionate to objectives, any assessment, 
including cost/benefit analysis, will take account of a great variety of 
factors including aspects of transposition, compliance and enforcement. 
The aim of the model is therefore to measure the overall expected burden 
(and benefits) of the policy for all stakeholders (governments at all levels, 
businesses and citizens). In this regard, it would be advisable to 
disaggregate the impact of a proposal on local and regional authorities 
from that on other stakeholders, by reason of their specificity as policy 
actors, to increase readability and allow more consistent analysis of the 
data collected.  
The Single Market regulatory toolbox is very diverse so improving 
the functioning of European markets requires a deep understanding of the 
most adequate mix of regulatory instruments.83 The selection of the most 
appropriate regulatory instrument must reflect the principles of regulatory 
quality developed by the Mandelkern Group on better regulation and this 
choice is inextricably linked to the principles of proportionality (‘matching 
the means to the aims’) but also accessibility and simplicity. 
Indeed, there is a clear trend towards the use of more flexible 
regulatory instruments or industry voluntary agreements, with the 
exception of some goods regulated under the New Approach, where 
Regulations are adopted more often than Directives. This trend towards 
more flexible regulatory instruments has received clear support from the 
Commission and other European institutions such as the European 
Economic and Social Committee.84 
                                                      
83 European Commission (2007d), “A single market for the 21st Century”, 
COM(2007)724 of 20.11.2007. 
84 The accompanying document to the Communication from the Commission on 
the future of the Single Market entitled “Instruments for a modernised Single 
Market policy”, clearly states that when regulation is necessary, flexible tools 
would be preferred since they account for regional differences and they can also be 
adapted over time according to the new market changes. Moreover, the 
Commission clearly supports the use of non-regulatory instruments as a 
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Self- and co-regulation, for instance, let the relevant industry players 
define their working rules.85 They offer many advantages, are easily 
implemented, flexible and they ensure the co-responsibility of all interested 
firms. Nonetheless, their success relies heavily on the adoption of effective 
monitoring and sanctions procedures (i.e. the credibility of the agreement) 
and the existence of a legislative framework that guarantees the legal 
security of other market players (e.g. consumers). In this sense, the 
database on self- and co-regulation launched in March 2008 by the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Commission will 
facilitate the exchange of good practices and their evaluation and 
monitoring.86 
Co-regulation appears in the context of the so-called New Approach 
Directives which solely define the mandatory essential requirements letting 
manufacturers choose the appropriate technical solutions to achieve them. 
There are three EU bodies in charge of defining those standards, two 
specialised (ETSI for telecom and CENELEC for electro 
technical/electronic) and one with general competences (CEN). Products 
complying with those harmonised standards can then be lawfully 
marketed across Europe. More than twenty years after their introduction, 
                                                                                                                                       
complement or alternative to regulation and proposes to develop a more coherent 
approach towards the use of ‘soft law’ (e.g. open method of coordination). There 
are therefore, different ways of achieving market integration other than the 
traditional legalistic approach. It should be stressed however, that flexible 
legislative instruments can also entail drawbacks in implementation. 
85 Following the Inter-institutional Agreement on Better lawmaking (2003), co-
regulation is defined as “the mechanism whereby a Community legislative act 
entrusts the attainment of the objectives defined by the legislative authority to 
parties which are recognised in the field (such as economic actors, the social 
partners, non-governmental organisations, or associations). This mechanism may 
be used on the basis of criteria defined in the legislative act so as to enable the 
legislation to be adapted to the problems and sectors concerned, to reduce the 
legislative burden by concentrating on essential aspects and to draw on the 
experience of the parties concerned”. Self-regulation on the other hand, is defined 
as “the possibility for economic operators, the social partners, non-governmental 
organisations or associations to adopt amongst themselves and for themselves 
common guidelines at European level (particularly codes of practice or sectoral 
agreements)”. 
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the New Approach Directives have proven to be extremely successful in 
ensuring the free movement of goods thanks to their flexibility.87 
Therefore, it might be interesting to explore whether the New 
Approach could be extended to other areas not yet covered by 
standardisation efforts. In this respect, possible candidates could be 
standards connected to priority actions for innovation. As pointed out by 
the European Commission, standardisation in the areas of sustainable 
industrial policy, lead markets, public procurement and in particular 
defence procurement, and the integration of ICT in industry and 
administrations, would contribute positively to the growth and 
competitiveness of the European industry.88 
In non-harmonised areas, the principle of mutual recognition ensures 
that the goods that are lawfully produced in one country can also be sold in 
the rest of the Union.89 Overall, mutual recognition improves free 
movement while preserving national regulatory autonomy. Moreover, the 
costs of over/misregulation now fall on member states and this results in 
pressure for less costly regulation (and possibly regulatory competition).90 
Despite its benefits, mutual recognition is generally unknown to 
European economic operators. A recent survey conducted by the 
Commission shows that most of the companies consulted are not familiar 
with the principle and 51% of the companies trading abroad do not rely on 
it compared to only 33% of companies that use the principle.91 This may be 
caused by a series of associated costs which have been significantly 
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implementation at member states level. This issue will be dealt in the following 
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88 COM (2008) 133 final. 
89 There are however some ‘general interest’ limitations to free movement that have 
been developed by the case law of the European Court of Justice.  
90 J. Pelkmans (2008), European integration: Methods and economic analysis, 3rd ed., 
Pearson Education. 
91 European Commission (2004), “Commission Recommendation of 12 July 2004 on 
the transposition into national law of Directives affecting the Internal Market”, OJ 
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reduced by the recent reforms affecting the Internal Market for goods (see 
text box below) but are still present in the market for services.92  
In reality, problems do not concern the principle of mutual 
recognition per se but rather its application by member states. The actual 
practice of national officials not relying on mutual recognition or of not 
acting in the spirit of the principle has caused business to be deeply 
disillusioned, especially SMEs wishing to enter other national markets in 
the Internal Market. Also, the New Approach has delivered a lot but 
eventually selective doubts emerged about some ‘Notified Bodies’ (i.e. 
certification bodies verifying whether European standards, backing up 
New Approach directives, have actually been complied with) and the 
solidity and scope of market surveillance by member states, besides 
understandable irritation about inconsistencies between directives (a 
problem for goods falling under several directives).  
Box 3.1 Improving mutual recognition: The 2008 ‘Goods package’ 
The 2008 ‘goods package’ consists of a cluster of three EC regulations and 
one EC decision93 to tackle these shortcomings. The smooth acceptance, 
indeed strongly positive cooperation of the European Parliament and 
Council, is a most encouraging signal for the better working of the internal 
goods market. Business associations are enthusiastic about the package. The 
most important change in the package is the decisive cost and uncertainty 
reduction for businesses when relying on mutual recognition for intra-EU 
market access. The main vehicle to accomplish this is a combination of a) the 
shift in the burden of proof away from the (entering) company towards the 
importing member state and b) the clarity about the technical exchange 
between the company and the importing member state, with clear 
obligations for active administrative cooperation between the relevant 
member states at all times. This new 'governance' of mutual recognition will 
render the idea of a presumption of compliance with essential health and 
safety requirements – and that is the spirit of mutual recognition – a normal 
fact of business life in EU goods markets. The presumption is there despite 
the possibility that technical requirements in the laws or decrees of the 
importing member state are somewhat different from those in the member 
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information costs, transaction costs, and compliance costs. 
93 See EC OJ L 218 of 13 August 2008, for Regulations 764/2008, 765/2008 and 
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state of origin. The company does not have to fear that the mere differences 
in the law cause its entry to be blocked or severely delayed. Of course, on 
reasonable request, the company should be able to document compliance in 
the EU country of origin (via standards, certification or test reports) and the 
importing member state, when still in doubt, should do its utmost to 
appreciate fully the requirements and verification in the country of origin. 
None of this leads to more than trivial costs to the company (since any 
bonafide company will dispose of such documents anyway) and in the 
overwhelming majority of instances, the importing member state will not 
challenge the mutual recognition presumption. And if it does challenge the 
latter, it must amply demonstrate why health or safety are endangered 
(although apparently not in the other member state), which renders it 
‘actionable’ for firms (via the Commission or the ECJ). Against non-bonafide 
companies, the importing member state remains as protected as before.  
As far as the New Approach is concerned, common rules raise the 
credibility of the Notified Bodies; besides, the European Cooperation for 
Accreditation (EA) will obtain public recognition and coordinate the actual 
accreditation process, ensuring that all member states use accreditation for 
their Notified Bodies. Furthermore, an equivalent level of market 
surveillance will be guaranteed under a common legal framework and with 
some minimum operational rules (thus, better and firmer than the RAPEX 
system for consumer goods). Decision 768/2008 sets up a horizontal 
framework rendering consistent the terminology and comparable 
obligations in 30 New Approach directives and related ones. However, a 
range of subsectors have claimed actual or potential opt-outs and it remains 
to be seen how far the improved consistency will help day-to-day business.  
While this approach may indeed contribute to eliminating residual 
obstacles in the market for goods, there is currently little knowledge on the 
practical implementation of mutual recognition in the services sector, with 
the exception of transport and finance.  
There is a clear need to address the remaining barriers that hamper 
the functioning of the Internal Market by making a better use of the 
legislative instruments available. Yet, addressing questions such as 
whether less flexible instruments should be preferred over more flexible 
ones or whether directives should have a narrower scope for discretion at 
national level, requires a targeted approach supported by in depth sectoral 
analysis. The complexity of the regulatory process implies that one-size fits 
all approach will not suit each sector needs.  POLICY-MAKING IN THE EU | 69 
Box 3.2 Different solutions to different problems: A sectoral approach to 
regulation 
The Single Market Programme, the Lisbon Strategy and the creation of EMU 
among others, have substantially changed the functioning of European 
markets during the past 15 years. In this new context, the European 
Commission within the framework of the Single Market Review advocated 
for a new approach to market monitoring. The aim is to study market 
functioning in a disaggregated manner so as to design policies “which are 
less legalistic and more based on sound economic evidence”.94 In a first 
screening exercise, the European Commission identified 23 malfunctioning 
sectors on the grounds of regulation, innovation, integration and 
competition (taken either individually or in combination).95 
Measuring the impact of regulation on various sectors is a complex 
task because of the scarcity of indicators with a broad sectoral coverage or 
with an adequate time span. So far, the OECD has been the only institution 
capable of producing such indicators for product market regulation. Despite 
their pitfalls96 they provide a good indication of the state of regulation for 
most sectors. As a result, the Commission’s initiative represents a welcome 
step in the direction of more evidence-based analysis and understanding of 
the consequences of regulation. However, greater clarity could be achieved 
as regards the selection criteria for the sector to be subjected to market 
analysis.  
Since regulation is mostly a sectoral approach, it is essential to deepen 
the knowledge on the regulatory constraints affecting each market so as to 
design a better targeted policy. It is currently too early to draw detailed 
conclusions on specific sectors (the first findings are expected by the end of 
2008); however the methodology and the results of the Commission’s 
exercise should be monitored closely not only to devise future policy 
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service sectors”, European Commission Economic Papers Series No. 336, August 2008. 
95 European Commission (2007h), Implementing the new methodology for product 
market and sector monitoring: results of a first sector screening, European Commission 
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intervention but also as a blueprint for future analyses/studies of the 
functioning of the Internal Market. 
Finally, potential solutions to existing shortcomings in the EU 
Internal Market may derive from regulatory innovation at the decision-
making stage, as in the case of the Lamfalussy procedure created to speed 
up the legislation on securities markets. In the same vein as the New 
Approach Directives, the Commission is advised by specialised committees 
for the technical preparation of the implementing measures, made up of 
representatives of national supervisory bodies. The emphasis placed on 
transposition and enforcement and the early involvement of sector experts 
is the key of the success of the Lamfalussy process, which has now been 
extended to the banking, insurance and pensions sectors.  
Regulatory innovation should also be encouraged at the enforcement 
stage. Alternative dispute settlement mechanisms may also complement 
the traditional judicial system facilitating the resolution of conflicts and 
avoiding costly procedures. These mechanisms have generally developed 
along with self-regulation agreements that already foresee how disputes 
are going to be dealt with.97 In this respect, the Commission or the 
Presidency could elaborate a report on the current state of alternative 
dispute settlement mechanisms and on how member states are using these 
tools on the ground. 
Encouraging flexible regulatory instruments must remain within the 
boundaries of legal security ensuring that there is no trade-off between 
flexibility and security. Thus, any proposal must respect the interests of all 
stakeholders, including consumers. In recent times, self-regulation 
initiatives have been extended to cover consumers. Moreover, consultation 
prior to the establishment of any policy is essential to the policy’s 
legitimacy and will prevent future problems of implementation and 
enforcement. As pointed out by the European Economic and Social 
Committee, the survival of self- and co- regulation and alternative dispute 
settlement mechanisms depends on their ability to safeguard the public 
interest, their transparency and the representativeness of the signatories 
and the effectiveness of the monitoring and enforcement.98 
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To conclude, impact assessment tools should be used to clearly define 
the costs and benefits arising from different policy options. As regards 
subsidiarity, strengthening the monitoring system set up by the CoR could 
potentially increase the involvement of national Parliaments in EU policy-
making. Finally, the current functioning of the principle of mutual 
recognition as well as the use of alternative dispute settlement mechanisms 
should be further studied in order to devise targeted intervention where 
necessary. 
3.2  Transposing and ‘correctly’ implementing  EU legislation 
The unique political structure of the European Union also translates into a 
unique legislative body where European and national (and sometimes 
regional and local) legislation coexists. Therefore, regulatory quality is a 
shared responsibility of the Union and its member states.99  
It is a well known fact that the Internal Market suffers from delays in 
transposition.100 The 2001 European Council consequently decided to limit 
member states’ transposition deficit to 1.5% and in 2007 the Heads of State 
and Government further reduced the allowed transposition deficit to 1%.101 
                                                      
99 Member states are indeed obliged by the Treaty to incorporate EU legislation 
into their national legislative structure and to ensure that national laws do not go 
against the Community objectives (Art. 10 TEC). Therefore, “Member states have 
primary responsibility for the correct and timely application of EU Treaties and 
legislation. They are responsible for the direct application of Community law, for 
the application of their laws implementing Community law and for the many 
administrative decisions taken under those laws. National courts also play an 
essential role in ensuring respect for the law including by referring issues to the 
court of Justice for a preliminary ruling” European Commission (2007c), “A 
Europe of results – Applying Community law”, COM(2007)502 of 05.09.2007. 
100 The Internal Market Scoreboard, published twice a year by the European 
Commission since 1997, presents detailed statistics on the state of transposition of 
Internal Market rules across the Union and the number of infringement procedures 
opened to those member states that have failed to duly transpose the directives.  
101 The transposition deficit shows the percentage of Internal Market directives not 
yet communicated to the Commission as having been transposed, in relation to the 
total number of Internal Market directives which should have been transposed by 
the deadline. In July 2008, the average transposition deficit (i.e. the percentage of 
Internal Market directives not yet communicated to the Commission as having 
been transposed, in relation to the total number of Internal Market directives) 
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However, as pointed out by the Internal Market Commissioner Charlie 
McCreevy: “It is not just timely transposition but also correct transposition 
and application across all member states that is crucial for a well 
functioning Internal Market”.102  
Hence, to make EU legislation really effective one should look at four 
aspects: transposition, administrative implementation, enforcement and 
interaction with national legislation. As recommendations may differ for 
each stage, we will address them separately while bearing in mind that 
they are inevitably interrelated throughout the policy-process. 
3.2.1  Lost in transposition? 
Transposition refers to the way in which EU legislation is incorporated into 
national law whereas implementation looks at the application of EU law at 
national level.103 
When transposing a directive into national law, member states are 
free to choose the form and methods they deem more efficient to achieve 
the objectives set up in the directive (Art. 249 TEC). As the objectives of the 
directive are binding for member states, transposition also requires 
checking the compatibility of the existing national law with the directive 
                                                                                                                                       
reached the 1% target which reflects the commitment of member states to correct 
their poor transposition record of previous years. Today, 18 member states have 
either 1% deficit or below and there are only five member states (Cyprus, 
Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal and Czech Republic) with a transposition deficit 
higher than 1.5%. There are, however, significant differences across countries. New 
member states have shown an amazing transposition record and today 5 out of the 
6 top performers belong to this group. Old member states, possibly influenced by 
stronger peer pressure, have also improved their transposition record reaching 
historically low values (e.g. France, Finland, Ireland, Germany). On the other side 
of the coin are Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Austria and Poland which 
have reversed their positive transposition trend. For further details, see European 
Commission (2008d), “Internal Market Scoreboard”, July, No. 17. 
102 Ibid., p 5. 
103 Being regulations directly applicable, transposition essentially refers to 
directives. Implementation, on the other hand, concerns regulations and directives 
alike. For further details, see BusinessEurope, op. cit., L. Allio and M.H. Fandel 
(2006),  Making Europe work: improving the transposition, implementation and 
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and to amend it or suppress it if incompatible with the directive. National 
law must, therefore, be fully compatible with European law.104 
To address existing shortcomings in transposition and 
implementation, action is needed on two fronts: prevention and the 
removal of existing obstacles.  
Better regulation practices adopted at EU level may have reduced the 
legislative burden on member states, which could explain the improved 
transposition performance of member states. However, according to the 
European Commission, this progress can be mostly attributed to the 
application by member states of the 2004 Commission Recommendation on 
the transposition into national law of Directives affecting the Internal 
Market.105 
The annex to the 2004 Commission recommendation identified a 
wide set of best practices aimed at facilitating “the correct and timely 
transposition into national law of directives affecting the Internal Market” 
covering aspects ranging from political commitment to operational and 
structure modifications. For instance, the nomination of a senior 
government member as responsible for monitoring the transposition of all 
Internal Market directives, the discussion of the state of transposition 
regularly in Ministerial meetings, the creation of a national network of 
officials responsible for monitoring transposition, issue guidelines, ensure 
early draft of the legislation transposing the directive elaborating 
correlation tables, improve the exchange of information between EU 
institutions and national parliaments at every stage of the legislative 
process, etc.106 
Box 3.3 Improving transposition: Positive national examples 
In 2007, the UK government, which has one of the most mature better 
regulation policies in Europe, published a transposition guide describing the 
steps to follow in order to effectively transpose EU directives into national 
law. The results are summarised in a so-called transposition checklist 
composed of 20 elements. First and foremost, the UK government gives 
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106 Ibid., pp. 50-52. See also EESC (2006), “Opinion on EU and national 
administration practices and linkages”, CESE 1564/2006, Brussels 14 December. 74 | IMPLEMENTATION AND SUBSIDIARITY 
special importance to the quantity and quality (training on how to handle 
EU negotiations and how to produce impact assessments) of the resources 
assigned to transposing EU legislation, an essential item that is rarely 
mentioned by national governments. In fact, ‘transposition’ should start 
before the proposal is published, by participating actively in Commission 
consultations and in the subsequent negotiations in the Council. Then, the 
costs and benefits of the various options for implementation should be 
analysed using the impact assessment methodology. The report also 
recommends the use of project management techniques to ensure timely and 
effective implementation (avoiding unnecessary burdens on the interested 
stakeholders). Finally, a post-implementation review is also foreseen to 
check on the quality of the process.  
The guidelines on best practice in the transposition of EU directives 
adopted by the Irish government - although much rougher - also emphasise 
the importance of clarifying the responsibilities of each governmental 
department and streamline monitoring. Moreover, it encourages continuous 
contacts with the Commission so as to facilitate transposition. 
Other governments, such as France, have also engaged in similar 
initiatives. 
Directive 98/34/EC was also identified as a potential success story in 
keeping under control the impressive amount of sectoral/specific rules 
issued by member states that greatly affect the functioning of the Internal 
Market, independently of European legislation. According to the Directive, 
member states must notify technical regulations, relating to products and 
information society services to the Commission in a draft and they must 
also observe a standstill period of at least three months before adopting the 
regulation so as to allow other member states and the Commission to study 
the potential impact of the proposed regulations on trade. By adopting a 
preventive approach and facilitating the communication between the 
relevant actors for a specific and technical field, desired objectives can be 
achieved more easily. 
Along the same lines, problems of implementation and enforcement 
can be addressed through prevention mechanisms embedded in future 
legislative acts, as in the case of the Services Directive (2006/123/EC).107 
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Box 3.4 Case study: The Services Directive 
The Services Directive is the first case where measures facilitating the 
implementation process and extensive mechanisms to ensure further 
compliance are laid down in the act itself. This should be considered as a 
major step forward. In fact, the traditional practice is purely vertical, i.e. 
between the relevant member state and the Commission, with the latter 
being responsible for checking member states compliance with the 
legislative act. In the case of the Services Directive, it was feared that 
traditional legal tools, such as Art. 10 TEC on loyal cooperation, would 
prove insufficient Therefore, the Directive includes several novelties which 
should in principle facilitate its implementation and further application: 
•  Administrative simplification. Chapter II of the Directive includes 
measures to deal with excessively complex national provisions and to 
facilitate compliance with several formal requirements. Art. 6 
introduces innovations such as single contact points serving as one-
stop-shops for administrative assistance and information to service 
providers. 
•  Administrative cooperation. Chapter VI of the Directive reverses a long 
standing belief/tradition that implementation and compliance with a 
directive is based on a vertical relation between member states and the 
Commission. Art. 28 of the Directive creates a framework for 
assistance and cooperation between member states during the 
implementation of the Directive. Other relevant provisions establish 
liaison points, alert mechanisms (in case of serious threats to the 
public by the service provider), and electronic systems for exchanging 
information on enforcement. 
•  Mutual evaluation. Art. 39 of the Directive provides one of the most 
important innovations: a system of mutual evaluation of 
implementation between member states. Under this system, the 
European Commission circulates reports produced by each member 
states to the other countries for feedback. This approach is expected to 
result in a healthy peer pressure among countries as well as a tool to 
pin-point relevant problems in the system and possibly identify 
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This system could be extended to other less complex areas, to increase 
the consistent implementation of Directives in the EU27.108  
In addition, the Commission has adopted a very hands-on approach to 
the implementation of the Services Directive, with EU officials regularly 
travelling to national capitals to oversee and support implementation in each 
country. This step-by-step approach is aimed at ensuring a maximum degree 
of harmonisation across the EU, which is crucial to guarantee that such 
complex piece of legislation achieves its stated impact on the Internal 
Market. Should this strategy deliver the expected results, it could be used 
more regularly for major pieces of EU legislation where proper 
implementation is key. 
Apart from the biannual Internal Market Scoreboard, since 2000 the 
Commission also publishes every two months the data on the progress in 
the notification of national measures implementing directives.109 Although 
interesting, the content and presentation of this information suffer from 
important operational pitfalls, especially as regards access to the data and 
available search options. This shortcoming is particularly relevant, as 
concentrating the relevant information on transposition would benefit 
national civil servants and the broader public. First, national civil servants 
would find it easier to contact their homologues in other member states and 
exchange good practices. Secondly, businesses and citizens would have 
detailed information on the tools at their disposal to ensure that their rights 
are respected and would find additional information of their interest such 
as relevant case law. Today, this information is spread over a myriad of 
sites, SOLVIT, SMEs portal, Enterprise Europe Network, Your Europe-
business, etc which makes it difficult for businesses to know their rights.  
Other than delays in transposition, member states can engage in other 
‘bad practices’ such as ‘gold-plating’, ‘double-banking’ or ‘regulatory 
creep’ which essentially lead to ‘over-implementation’ of EU legislation. 
The former implies going beyond the requirements of the directive when 
transposing into national law. ‘Double-banking’ appears when there are 
overlaps between national legislation and the newly transposed directive. 
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As for ‘regulatory creep’ it refers to uncertainty created about the status of 
the regulations or over-zealous enforcement.110  
In order to avoid such bad practices in transposition, the European 
Commission has repeatedly insisted on the need for using and publishing 
concordance tables between the EU legal acts and national transposition 
measures.111 This would increase the transparency of the transposition 
process and improve the access to and understanding of new legislation by 
all interested parties. In fact, this practice is already common for some 
legislative measures. However, member states tend to publish concordance 
tables only when the measure is fully binding and they neglect it when it is 
only recommended.  
In this respect, the organisation of regular meetings between national 
authorities and the creation of dedicated networks to share, discuss and 
exchange advice on transposition issues would gradually foster a sense of 
ownership and lead to better implementation results in the long run.112 
Moreover, businesses cannot clearly establish whether a particular 
legislation is ‘purely’ national or whether it is the result of the transposition 
of European legislation. This leads to strong misperceptions on the 
legislative activity of the Community that is traditionally accused of 
excessive regulation whereas in many cases the relevant legislation is 
‘purely’ national. 
While the above approaches outline a viable strategy to prevent the 
creation of future regulatory barriers stemming from the transposition of 
EU legislation, this still leaves unresolved the issue of the barriers already 
in place and whose real extent is difficult to measure. In this respect, the 
Services Directive offers an unprecedented opportunity to uncover the real 
magnitude of regulatory initiatives undertaken at the national level. In 
particular, Art. 39 of the Directive mandates a screening of national 
legislation on services to be used as a basis for the future review of the 
Directive. This screening is the best chance that the EU has to open a 
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transparent and non politicised debate on all existing services law and to 
identify outdated or problematic regulation. As a result, the screening 
could possibly lead to the elimination of unnecessary rules without 
damages to the Internal Market and more importantly it would provide 
policy-makers with a sound basis/evidence for future decisions. The 
significance of this screening exercise cannot be overstated. 
3.2.2  Enforcement and infringements management 
On a preliminary note, it is worth stressing that despite the existence of the 
enforcement and infringement management tools discussed below, 
available resources do not allow the European Commission to oversee and 
correct in a timely manner all implementation problems. It is thus 
necessary to prevent problems from occurring ex-ante, by paying attention 
to implementation and enforcement issues right from the start of 
policy/legislative formulation at the EU level, in line with the suggestions 
put forward in the previous Chapters. 
The added value of European legislation does not only hinge on its 
correct transposition but also on its homogeneous application and 
enforcement. Yet, as pointed out by Nicolaides and Oberg,113 member states 
may fail to comply with EU legislation because they are unwilling 
(domestic political opposition), unable (legal and administrative obstacles 
and/or lack of human and material resources) or they are simply unaware 
of their obligations. There are two aspects of compliance that must be 
considered: transposition, which has been addressed in length in the 
previous section, and the role of the national judges who ultimately enforce 
European legislation. 
National judges are assisted by the European Court of Justice through 
preliminary rulings. The procedure, described in Art.234 TEC, allows any 
national court to question the European Court of Justice about Community 
law before issuing a ruling. The system therefore promotes cooperation 
between the national courts and the European Court of Justice while 
ensuring the homogeneous application of EU legislation in all member 
states.  
In addition to traditional means of enforcement through national 
courts, which often entail costly and lengthy judicial procedures, an 
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effective alternative is provided by SOLVIT. SOLVIT is a network created 
seven years ago by the Commission and the member states with the aim of 
solving problems of misapplication of Internal Market legislation. Each 
member state has a SOLVIT centre that cooperates directly with its 
counterparts in other countries and with the Commission via an on-line 
database to solve the problems in a rapid and functional manner. The latest 
report on the performance of the SOLVIT network shows a clear increase in 
the number of cases submitted to SOLVIT, with Spain, Germany, France, 
Poland, the United Kingdom and Italy being the countries with the highest 
case flow.114 The success of SOLVIT is mainly due to the high resolution 
rates and its rapidity. Yet, the data still reflect a potential for a further use 
of the network.  
The incredible increase in the number of cases submitted by citizens’ 
with respect to businesses is an additional proof of the success of the 
network and an interesting reflection of what appear to be the more 
problematic areas (according to the number of cases submitted): social 
security and professional qualifications.  
Figure 3.1 Cases handled in 2007 by problem area 
 
Source: Solvit 2007 report. 
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Should this trend persist in the future, it might be wise to create 
specialised divisions within SOLVIT to ensure an efficient treatment of 
every case independently of the case submitter. Other problems also need 
addressing, namely the large number of non-SOLVIT cases received which 
should encourage member states to create similar structures to address 
problems with national legislation, and more worrying the lack of legal 
expertise to handle the cases efficiently and the unwillingness of recipient 
authorities to cooperate. Member states should act accordingly by 
improving the quality and the number of resources attached to their 
SOLVIT centres so as to be able to cope with the increasing workload. 
Moreover, cooperation between administrations across member states 
should be further encouraged to bring down the remaining resistances of 
some administrations.  
The European Commission as ‘guardian of the Treaties’ has also a 
central role to play in ensuring the homogeneous application and 
enforcement of EU law in all member states. This includes infringement 
procedures (Arts. 226 and 228 TEC) to tackle the non-implementation or 
misapplication of EU Law by individual member states.115 However the 
average length of such procedure limits its effectiveness. In this respect, the 
Expert Group welcomed the Commission’s initiative to prioritise the 
management of cases according to their expected risks and their potential 
impact for citizens and businesses and the most persistent infringements 
have been confirmed by the Court.116 Against this background, as pointed 
out by BusinessEurope,117 possible solutions could be the adoption of fast-
track mechanisms for less relevant or repetitive cases and improved 
transparency and information towards the general public and the business 
sector in particular for the cases related to the functioning of the Internal 
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Market. In this vein, the Commission has recently agreed to outline its 
priorities in the annual reports on the application of Community law which 
is a much welcomed decision to increases the transparency and credibility 
of the system.  
3.3  National legislation: Coordination between the EU and member 
states 
Improving the links between national and EU administration at every stage 
of the legislative process is key to the success of any legislative measure. 
And yet, as pointed out by the European Economic and Social Committee: 
“National coordination and policy-making has never been deeply 
discussed at EU level, partly because of subsidiarity, partly because of a 
lack of genuine interest among the decision-making bodies in Brussels and 
in the capitals….But it is clear that the way national coordination and 
policy-making are organised and function may well have substantial effects 
on decision-making in Brussels and subsequently on transposition and 
implementation of EU law.”118  
Some member states have already introduced the necessary 
administrative reforms to be involved in the decision-making process at an 
early stage e.g. participating in Commission consultations.119 Further 
involvement is expected in the future once national Parliaments formally 
start to check on subsidiarity. The Commission should also assist member 
states during the transposition phase and favour the establishment of one-
stop shops (a single contact point for information and completion of 
formalities).120 
In this context, a potential step forward would be to involve 
implementing officials as early as possible in the work of the national 
negotiating team at EU level. While there are no specific rules regarding the 
cooperation between delegates at the EU level and national civil servants, 
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and every member state is free to choose the degree of involvement of 
implementing officials, increasing their participation in the decision-
making phase would strengthen the preventive approach to problems 
advocated above and increase the chances of proper implementation. 
Following the adoption of the Inter-institutional agreement in 2003, a 
High Level Group of national experts was created by the Commission. The 
initiative has not received sufficient back up from member states so the 
activities of the Group have remained unknown to the general public. A 
formal political support from the Council would be advisable, since the 
exchange of information and especially the organisation of meetings would 
create a sense of ownership among civil servants and facilitate the 
exchange of good practices. The experience of SOLVIT has proven that this 
kind of initiatives coordinated by the Commission can be extremely 
successful.121 
In particular, reinforcing the visibility of valuable/helpful EU 
recommendations and guidelines is crucial for a correct understanding and 
implementation of EU legislation by the member states. Moreover, 
additional networking activities between national administrations and 
between the national and EU levels should be envisaged. More specifically, 
further action could prove particularly useful in the following areas: 
administrative cooperation; other obligations of cooperation (such as 
SOLVIT); the training of national civil servants; creation of contact points 
and organisation of regular meetings; and other means to facilitate 
communication (e.g. various platforms where people can exchange 
information on legislation, etc.). Visible steps in this direction have already 
been taken with a pilot project managed by the Commission’s Secretariat 
General to monitor infringement procedures. The outcome/result of this 
initiative should be monitored to draw useful lessons for future similar 
initiatives as those suggested in this section. 
Finally, there is a strong need for greater communication towards the 
broader public and in particular towards businesses directly affected by EU 
legislation in their daily work. In this respect, the European Commission 
has the expertise and the tools necessary to overcome this gap. It could for 
instance, facilitate the organisation of meetings bringing together 
businesses and promoting the exchange of information. The European 
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Commission has a clear added-value in putting into place a legal 
framework, IT facilities and making resources available for this type of 
initiatives. As mentioned above, a similar approach has been already used 
with positive results for SOLVIT, whose success calls for an expansion to 
other areas. In the long run, one can expect that increased support to 
businesses in their daily interaction with EU rules will contribute to a 
greater integration of the Internal Market with positive spillovers for 
consumers and citizens. 
3.4  Concluding remarks 
In this section, we suggest a set of key recommendations for a better and 
more consistent implementation of EU law. For ease of reading, the 
suggestions are divided between tasks to be performed at the EU level and 
suggestion directed to the member states. After all, only a combination of 
efforts at European and national level (and sub-national, when relevant) 
will guarantee the good functioning of the Internal Market and deliver a 
suitable regulatory environment for European business. 
At the EU level, the Expert Group formulated the following 
recommendations: 
•  The Commission should issue practical technical guidelines on the 
application of the subsidiarity principle. 
•  There should be a single EU website directed to businesses. 
On the other hand, member states should: 
•  Launch an in-depth screening exercise of national regulations that 
hinder the Internal Market. 
•  Appoint national coordinators of EU policy. 
•  Consider appointing a responsible for subsidiarity and 
proportionality in each national Parliament. 
•  Adopt national implementation plans for EU legislation. 
•  Improve information on transposition and implementation through 
the use of concordance tables. 
•  Create networks of officials to improve the transposition and 
implementation of EU legislation. 
•  Create specialised divisions within SOLVIT.  
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4.  CONCLUSIONS - THE WAY FORWARD: 
BOOSTING LONG-TERM EUROPEAN 
COMPETITIVENESS 
he previous sections have illustrated the ideas discussed by our three 
Expert Groups for improving the quality of EU legislation. Most of 
these ideas can be tackled in the short term, as they require no Treaty 
change, and are addressed at the upcoming EU Presidencies as suggestions 
to shape the European Union of the future. Our suggestions aim at 
transforming Europe into a community in which a world-class 
administration (the Commission) leads political agents (the Parliament, the 
Council, national parliaments, implementing officials) towards the 
achievement of real better regulation, to the benefit of society as a whole; a 
community in which dialogue between the EU and member state level 
finally speaks the same language – the language of better regulation; and a 
community in which businesses face lower compliance costs, and have easy 
access to institutions when compliance becomes a problem. We believe that 
implementing these ideas could significantly improve the effectiveness of 
EU policy, to the benefit of all Europeans. In this context, it is worth 
remembering that the Single Market with its four freedoms of movement is 
the core of the European project: this should be taken as a starting point for 
any reform effort, as completion of the Single Market will deliver benefits 
in other areas. 
In particular, when looking forward to the post-Lisbon decade, the 
EU should also do more in terms of eliminating barriers to the Internal 
Market, by identifying and removing inconsistent legislation in member 
states and thus facilitating cross-border operations by businesses and 
consumers. We believe that this objective could be achieved only if the 
harmonisation of legislation is given a more prominent role in the EU 
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debate, both at the policy formulation stage, and in the implementation at 
national level. Businesses and especially SMEs, need harmonised rules to 
cross their national borders and become real EU players. In the long run, 
the resulting increased competition and variety of products would 
enormously benefit European consumers.  
Looking at Europe in a few years from now, the current patchwork of 
national rules should be replaced by a set of common rules and standards. 
In order to achieve this goal, legislation should be harmonised in stages, 
starting from the areas in which rules differ without any overarching 
reason. Accordingly, the Commission’s initiative of reviewing the Single 
Market is welcome. It is crucial that sectoral reviews lead to the 
identification of areas where harmonisation is needed, and that this in turn 
leads to policy action to remove barriers.  
Will this be enough? We suspect not. Discussions between CEPS 
experts and senior staff at the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise have 
led to the identification of a number of initiatives that may significantly 
boost Europe’s growth and competitiveness in the years to come. Too often 
the harmonisation of legislation is hampered by national prerogatives and 
the need to protect domestic firms. Advocating a smooth transition 
towards harmonised rules in key policy domains is simply utopia, as of 
today. As long as national interests remain a real bottleneck – for example, 
in Council negotiations – this process may never be completed. Currently, 
EU institutions can decide not to harmonise legislation in certain fields 
without actually providing any justification. At a minimum, we believe that 
EU institutions should motivate their decision not to remove barriers to the 
Internal Market when they take action to formulate new legislation or 
review existing ones. This is why we propose to “reverse the burden of 
proof”, by establishing a presumption that new EU rules in areas in need of 
harmonisation should in principle be regulations, or directives that leave 
very limited discretion to member states in the implementation phase.  
Implementing this vision in practice means following a number of 
steps: 
•  Review the stock of legislation and identify areas where 
harmonisation is needed. This is what the Commission has started to 
do within the framework of the Single Market Review, and should be 
expanded and transformed into an in-depth screening. But sectoral 
analyses should be presented together with a clear description of the 
baseline: such description can be used as ‘zero option’ in future 
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•  For these areas, ‘reverse the burden of proof’. This means that the 
Commission introduces in the IA guidelines a new ‘harmonisation 
test’ (or a ‘modified subsidiarity test’), where the burden of proof is 
on the Commission to depart from regulations to adopt more flexible 
instruments. Of course, this approach should be adopted only once 
the need for action has been adequately justified (as already occurs in 
Commission impact assessments). In a nutshell, if the Commission 
wants to adopt a directive in an area where harmonisation has been 
considered necessary (e.g. privacy legislation), then the Commission 
services in charge of the IA would have to make the case for such a 
choice. If they fail, the IAB should impose them to revise the IA or 
propose the adoption of a different instrument. This system can be 
adapted and refined. For example, besides calling for more 
regulations, it can also apply to the degree of flexibility left by 
directives to member states, so that the rules are as harmonised as 
possible, unless there is evidence that more flexibility would bring a 
clear added value. For example, in some cases mutual learning and 
competition between legal systems may lead to a ‘race to the top’ that 
the Commission could never achieve.  
•  Add new areas. Once the process has started, new sectoral analyses 
should be launched to complete the Single Market Review, leading to 
more baselines to be used as a starting point for the harmonisation of 
legislation. This ensures that EU institutions and member states keep 
the momentum in overcoming harmful discrepancies in national 
legislation.  
•  Constantly monitor legislation. The use of ex post evaluation should 
become more widespread and important, so that areas in which 
barriers to the Internal Market are not gradually removed are kept 
under constant scrutiny and are potentially subject to further 
intervention. In doing this, the use of indicators appears of utmost 
importance: in particular, efforts should be devoted to developing 
both indicators of governance and regulatory quality; and indicators 
that focus on the daily life of businesses, which provide a clear 
picture of the remaining ‘cost of non-Europe’ from the perspective of 
operators. The latter indicators can be derived from the expansion of 
the Standard Cost Model to compliance costs; as well as by 
improving upon the concept of ‘doing business’ indicators currently 
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This long-term strategy crucially depends on the implementation of 
many of the suggestions identified in the previous Chapters. For example:  
•  An effective presumption in favour of harmonisation in certain policy 
domains becomes possible only if the Commission updates the IA for 
major proposals after they are amended by the Parliament and the 
Council. This way, if MEPs or national governments resist the 
achievement of the Internal Market by amending Commission 
proposals in a less ‘Europe-ist’ way, they would have to do it against 
the evidence brought by the Commission, which points to a need for 
harmonising rules.  
•  The expansion of the Standard Cost Model to compliance costs can 
help the Commission and member states in identifying areas where 
the daily life of a business (and later, possibly also citizens) is 
significantly affected by the lack of common rules, through evidence 
of cases in which the cost and patterns of compliance with EU 
legislation widely differ throughout the territory of the EU.  
•  The possibility for businesses to present evidence of the need for 
harmonisation during a consultation on draft IAs is key for 
establishing a climate in which priority is given to the Single Market. 
In many cases, large and small businesses know better than 
legislators where the potential for lowering barriers lies, and are able 
to provide evidence of the potential benefits of further harmonisation.  
•  Convergence between EU and national better regulation strategies 
ensures that the efforts put into improving the quality of EU 
legislation are not lost due to a patchy and widely diverging 
transposition and implementation. The same can be said for the 
establishment of a common set of indicators, as well as for the 
appointment of national coordinators of EU policy.  
•  The increased use of ex post evaluation is necessary for the monitoring 
of the performance of individual pieces of legislation, especially if 
coupled with the use of indicators. In this respect, the availability of 
concordance tables significantly facilitates the monitoring phase.  
•  The adoption of practical technical guidelines on subsidiarity can 
significantly prevent the risk of over-implementation, especially if 
coupled with the appointment of responsible persons for subsidiarity 
and proportionality in National Parliaments, and the creation of 
networks of implementing officials for complex pieces of legislation. 88 | CONCLUSIONS - THE WAY FORWARD 
The same can be said for the Task Force of representatives of National 
Parliaments.  
•  Finally, from the perspective of businesses, the availability of a single 
website for businesses containing, inter alia information on the 
implementation of legislation and responsible officials in member 
states, can prove particularly effective in reducing the current degree 
of unawareness of certain EU policies. Should problems emerge, a 
more effective and specialised SOLVIT can help businesses in filing 
complaints and find an effective solution in a short timeframe.  
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